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Abstract
We empirically investigate the effect of procurement oversight on contract outcomes.
In particular, we stress a distinction between public and private oversight: the for-
mer is a set of bureaucratic checks enacted by contracting offices, while the latter is
carried out by private insurance companies whose money is at stake through the so-
called performance bonding. By focusing on the U.S. federal service contracts in the
period 2005-2015, we exploit an exogenous variation in the threshold for the applica-
tion of both sources of oversight in order to separately estimate their causal effects
on execution costs and time. We find that: (i) private oversight has a positive effect
on outcomes through the screening of bidders that alters the pool of winning firms;
(ii) public oversight negatively affects outcomes, due to excessive red tape induced by
low-competence buyers.
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I Introduction
Efficient contract procurement is a complex task. Sellers have private information on pro-
duction costs that are not fully disclosed through the offers, and incentives in exerting sub-
optimal levels of effort once awarded the contract. The asymmetry of information between
buyer and seller, combined with the intrinsic cost uncertainty at the awarding stage, paves
the way for the emergence of adverse selection and moral hazard during the procurement
process (Laffont and Tirole, 1990; Bajari and Lewis, 2014). In turn, these issues lead to the
renegotiation of contract terms, increases in costs and time to completion and, ultimately,
efficiency losses. Public procurement accounts for 12 percent of GDP in OECD member
countries and it draws its budget on public resources;1 hence, dealing with the above fric-
tions is a first-order concern for public procurers as contract inefficiency is at tax payers
expense.
To cope with this well-known phenomenon, the academic literature has focused on the
role of awarding procedures in screening bidders and optimal contract design in avoiding
misbehavior.2 In fact, while in the practice of public procurement the handling of the
contract execution stage is seen as the first-order concern, with a few notable exceptions
(Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis, 2014; Lewis and Bajari, 2011) previous empirical contribution
focused on the contract awarding phase - which is only one side of the coin - and ignored
the operational phase, or separately analyzed the two stages. Yet, an efficient procurement
regulation should require a balanced level of global contract management tools - i.e., tools
that include both phases by alleviating the adverse selection before the contract award and
the moral hazard during the project execution - and even rely on outsourcing to the private
sector when this proves to be beneficial (Banerjee et al., 2017; Hart, Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). Throughout the paper, we label such tools “oversight”. Although the optimal level
of oversight is well defined in theoretical contributions (Shavell, 1984), however it is fiercely
debated in practical applications.3 This work aims at filling this gap by providing empirical
1Source: http://www.oecd.org/governance/public-procurement/ accessed on May 31, 2018.
2Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2009) and Decarolis (2014) belong to the former group, Bajari and Tadelis
(2001) to the latter.
3See for example the technical reports GAO (2013) and Garvin et al. (2011).
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evidence that oversight in public procurement matters.
We propose a distinction between public and private oversight, depending on its source.
Public oversight includes all formal checks - solicitation procedures, cost certifications, pric-
ing data transmission, production surveillance - which the contracting authorities enact
during both the contract awarding process and the project execution. It typically involves
considerable paperwork for buyer and sellers, but at the cost of some red tape, it is aimed at
alleviating adverse selection and moral hazard (Kaufman, 1977; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).
Combinations of red tape and bureaucrats’ ineptitude might be deadly for procurement pro-
cesses: in February, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sentenced against
the federal government because the U.S. Navy officials took two years after the original com-
pletion date to accept the project as complete and caused million dollars of losses to the
contractor.4 On the other hand, private oversight involves third parties - surety companies -
issuing bonds (performance bonds) to secure the buyer against unpredictable events.5 If the
seller fails to fulfill contractual tasks, contracting authorities make claims to recover losses
and the underwriting surety is called upon either to complete the project by itself (i.e.,
with its own resources or by subcontracting) or, as last instance, to refund the authority of
the bond value.6 Being liable in case of unsatisfactory contract outcomes provides a strong
incentive for sureties to both screen bidders (ex ante) and monitor contractors (ex post).
They help mitigate the asymmetry of information between the buyer and the seller through
the screening enacted by price discrimination on premia, which directly affects the offers
placed by potential contractors.7 Hence, private oversight enhances the selection of the best
contractors and provides a second tier of monitoring of contractors’ progresses.
Identifying the extent to and the channels through which public and private oversight
affect contract outcomes has clear policy implications. Moreover, the performance bond-
4Metcalf Construction Company, Inc. v. United States began a control for disputes with the federal
government and also provides rationale useful to contractors in disputes with any public or private project
owner. See http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-federal-circuit/1656993.html.
5Surety companies (more simply sureties) usually are subsidiaries of insurance companies.
6The rationale of the law was initially to protect the buyer from losses in case of seller’s bankruptcy.
7Premia paid for performance bonds may vary depending on the valuation of bidder quality. Hence,
ceteris paribus, worse contractors face higher premia, their bids are higher and their likelyhood to win the
auction lower.
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ing is an increasingly popular tool in procurement governance and in many countries there
is an ongoing debate about their efficacy; this paper contributes by providing quantitative
support.8 The U.S. constitutes an excellent case study for the outlined framework as both
public and private oversight are required depending on the industry and contract value. Fur-
thermore, performance bonding is well-known among all players in the procurement market
in the U.S. as it was the first country to introduce it in 1894.9
In this paper we use a recently available database containing contract-level information
on the universe of U.S. federal procurement.10 Focusing on 2005-2015 service contracts,
our identification strategy relies on the contemporaneous change (occurring on October 1,
2010, that is the beginning of fiscal year 2011) of the threshold for (i) the Simplified Acqui-
sition Procedures, exempting all federal procurement contracts from public oversight; and
(ii) the Miller Act, the law requiring private oversight only in construction projects through
performance bonding.11 We use a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach to
estimate the causal effect of the different sources of oversight on performance outcomes.12
Specifically, for the whole population of federal service procurement contracts, we compare
the average change in outcomes of contracts that are exempted from public oversight with
corresponding changes among those that remain subject to the requirement. To take into
account possible differences between construction and other services, due to the additional
application of private oversight to the former procurement category, we simultaneously com-
pare changes in outcomes between the two groups.
Backed up by a battery of robustness checks on sample selection, suitability of empirical
strategy and risk of differential shocks, our reduced-form analysis yields two main findings.
8Performance bonds are widely used at government-level procurement not only in the U.S., but also
in Japan and Canada. Also, many states in the U.S. have introduced performance bonding through the
so-called “Little Miller Act”. In 1999, the European Commission’s Enterprise Section published a report
titled “Abnormally low tenders” with detection and rejection rules for abnormally low tenders and started
a working group on performance bonds (European Commission Enterprise Section, 1999).
9The Heard Act, requiring performance bonds on all federally funded projects, was replaced by the Miller
Act in 1935.
10The Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG) is publicly available at
https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng cms/index.php/en/ and updated on a daily basis. The FPDS database is
well documented and was recently used by Liebman and Mahoney (2017), among the others.
11The subset of service contracts totals around $5.6 trillion in government expenditure.
12Recently, Bergman et al. (2016) used the same econometric approach in the procurement of elderly care
services in Sweden.
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First, exempting contracts from private oversight negatively affects performance in terms of
time and cost, worsening it by 9 and 4.2 percent, respectively. We then exploit firm-level
data to provide evidence that adverse selection plays a key role in driving our estimates. All
the above findings are in line with Calveras, Ganuza and Hauk (2004), who develop a model
of public procurement with performance bonding, where the premium paid is proportional
to the riskiness of the bidder, and show that the presence of private oversight improves the
selection of winning firms.13 Second, we find that exempting contracts from public oversight
improves both time and cost outcomes, leading to increases in performance of 7.2 percent
and 5.3 percent, respectively. This is in line with the results of Calvo, Cui and Serpa (2016);
however, we also find that the red tape effect in public oversight is negatively correlated with
the contracting authority quality, and we do not find any significant outcome when estimating
the treatment effect on the subset of high-competence offices.14 In the construction sector,
where the 2011 reform implied the simultaneous elimination of both public and private
oversight, we find that their combined effect on contract performance is ambiguous: we
observe a decrease in time performance of 1.8 percent and an increase in cost performance of
.6 percent. The straightforward implication of our results is that an effective reform should
exempt contractors from public oversight and keep the benefits of the private oversight.
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal procurement regulation and to the
debate on effectiveness of public vs. private supply of public goods. In turn, the first
strand can be divided into two branches depending on the focus of the analysis: i) papers
dealing with ex-ante regulations through the analysis of auction formats, contract types,
awarding procedures and their effects on participation and performances (recent examples
in this literature include Marion (2007), Board (2007), Marion (2009), Krasnokutskaya and
Seim (2011), Bajari and Lewis (2014), and Branzoli and Decarolis (2015)); and ii) papers
focusing on ex-post tools for enhancement of contract outcomes: oversight (Calvo, Cui and
Serpa, 2016) and relational contracting (Coviello, Guglielmo and Spagnolo, 2017; Banerjee
13The premium is incorporated into the bid and affects the probability of winning the tender. Thus, the
higher the risk for the surety, the higher the premium charged and the lower the chance of winning.
14The definition of competence is controversial and we will not address it in the present paper. In our
exercise we will proxy competence through the closely related concept of performance persistence: we will
use a weighted distribution of past contractual performance and divide our sample into competent and
incompetent offices depending on the median value (Decarolis et al., 2018).
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and Duflo, 2000; Calzolari and Spagnolo, 2009). Our paper combines these approaches in
disentangling the role of performance bonding as a regulatory element on the one hand and
as a mean to increase monitoring of contractors on the other.
We emphasize the choice between direct provision of public services and outsourcing
to private contractors (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Examples of empirical economic
analyses of government efficiency that make use of direct measurements of outcomes, the
approach our paper follows, include Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), Reinikka and Svensson
(2004), Olken (2006, 2007), Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), Fisman and Gatti
(2006), Fisman and Miguel (2007), Hyytinen, Lundberg and Toivanen (2009), and Ferraz and
Finan (2008, 2011). In their paper, Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) identify the amount
and the sources of public waste in Italian public procurement. They find that inefficiency is
by far the most important dimension in explaining public waste, with heterogeneity across
different buyers, and that the best performance - both in terms of active and passive waste
- is associated with more discretion. According to Kelman (1990) and Kelman (2005), an
ultimate cause of passive waste in the U.S. federal government is that an excessive regulatory
burden may make procurement cumbersome and increase average prices: our results on the
public oversight effect provide support to this argument.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically assess the role of
performance bonding and the associated private oversight in public procurement. Despite
not being widely known, performance bonding is a founding pillar of the U.S. public con-
struction procurement, which is a crucial economic sector worth approximately $32 billion,
and was extensively used during the recent financial crisis as a fiscal policy tool to stimu-
late the economy (see the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act).15 Both at the federal
level (Miller act) and the state level (Little Miller Acts), there were only slight variations in
the regulations before the 2011 reform; therefore, assessing the effectiveness of performance
bonds has essentially been impossible. On top of that, the low default rate of federal con-
struction contractors (less than 1 percent) has been interpreted at times as an indication that
performance bonds are redundant and represent an unnecessary cost for firms and public
15Year 2013, source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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buyers, and should therefore be eliminated (Gransberg, Kraft and Park, 2014). This paper,
instead, uses novel variation to identify the causal effect of this instrument and reveals that
its quantitative effects on contract performance are large and positive, both in terms of time
and costs. Furthermore, providing evidence in favor of the screening role of sureties reverses
the causality previously highlighted: performance bonding is what helps keep the default
rate low by enhancing the selection of the best contractors.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In section II, we present the concept
of performance bonding and the related U.S. legislative context; section III deals with the
theoretical background underlying our analysis; section IV outlines the data we employ in
our analysis; section V addresses the empirical analysis, outlines the identification strategy
and presents results plus robustness checks; in section VI, we discuss the main drivers of our
findings. Section VII concludes.
II Context
In this section, we first describe the institution of performance bonding and the economic
rationale underlying its provision in public procurement regulations; when presenting its
legislative foundations in the U.S. federal procurement we define the private oversight. We
then shift the focus to the U.S. federal procurement regulation to define and discuss the
public oversight.
II.1 Private and Public Oversight
Performance Bonding Procuring supplies entails strategic considerations on competi-
tion, tender design and optimal ex-post rating in order to ensure the maximum benefit for
the procurer. When dealing with procurement of services, buyers also face uncertainty re-
lated to production cost and business factor dynamics: unexpected negative shocks could
hit contractors during the execution of the work, leading to profit erosion and, ultimately,
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losses.16 In the worst-case scenario, contractors are forced to declare bankruptcy, leaving
the work incomplete and the buyer with no party to make claims against. Avoiding such
lose-lose outcomes is a first-order concern for all parties, and situations of this sort are typ-
ically handled by renegotiating contract provisions either in terms of delivery time or costs.
This leaves room for moral hazard and adverse selection issues, as low-quality firms may
take advantage of cost uncertainty at the awarding stage, underbid and then renegotiate
once awarded the contract - e.g. by pretending to have suffered an unexpected negative cost
shock (Guasch, Laffont and Straub, 2008).
Hence, when the contractors’ probability of default is high, it makes sense for buyers to
take out an insurance to avoid bearing all risks on their own. The performance bonding
is a specific line of insurance based on the issuance of a performance bond and involving
three parties: the surety guarantees that the contractor will perform the tasks demanded by
the buyer.17 In other words, the performance bonding works as a risk-transfer mechanism
between the buyer and the surety company, but it is demanded by a third party - the
contractor - that guarantees the performance of an obligation.
Prior to issuing a bond, the potential contractor is subject to a screening process by
the surety - consisting of an assessment of its entire business operations, financial resources,
experience, organization, backlog, profitability and management capability - aimed at extrap-
olating private information on its type. The surety, thanks to its access to firms’ information
during the prequalification phase and its prior experience of the market, is able to evaluate
the contractor’s ability to fulfill the contract provisions.18 The whole process culminates in
the determination of a premium, an actuarially based fee that varies depending on the size,
type and duration of the project and, notably, on how the characteristics of the contractor
that emerged from the screening process match the project complexity. In the U.S., the bond
16According to the OECD, services are “outputs produced to order and which cannot be traded separately
from their production”. A broader definition provided by the management literature is based on “the five
I’s”: Intangibility, Inventory, Inseparability, Inconsistency and Involvement. Either way, throughout the
paper we will distinguish supplies contracts from service contracts according to the underlying timing of
production: while goods could - in principle - be stored and sold outright, services are customized and need
time to be produced and delivered after the contract award.
17The legal definitions for buyer and contractor are obligee and principal, respectively.
18Performance bonds are common across the entire U.S. construction industry. Construction bonds gen-
erate two-thirds of total surety premia written and 70 percent of total revenues.
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price mostly ranges 0.5-3 percent of the contract amount and the potential contractor typ-
ically incorporates the bond premium amount into the offer. Hence, the screening enacted
by the surety makes the premium a prominent ex-ante mechanism for discriminating among
potential contractors. The premium, by reducing the asymmetry of information and affect-
ing the offered bid amount, takes a relevant role in determining the quality of the winner in
a competitive tender and shifts adverse selection issues away from the procurer, whose only
piece of information about the sellers at the award stage is the offer placed.
Furthermore, sureties systematically gather and analyze information regarding bonded
contractors after the contract award. They have the legal right to access information on
work progress, payments and the estimated percentage of completion for bonded projects.
Prior to modifying any contractual term, procurers and contractors shall obtain the consent
of the surety on the basis of the gathered information on contractor conduct.19 Hence, in
addition to being screened, bonded contractors undergo an ex-post monitoring process by
sureties. Hence, performance bonding also shifts moral hazard issues away from the buyer.
A comparison with letters of credit (LOC), widely used in the European procurement
market, might be useful to better understand how performance bonds differ from other
traditional forms of guarantee in their nature and the underlying incentives provided. A
LOC, normally issued by a bank, is a cash guarantee to the buyer who can call on demand
and receive a pre-specified amount of money if some breach of contract were to occur. A
performance bond protects the buyer from nonperformance and financial exposure, should
the contractor default. Hence, while the performance of the contract has no or little relation
to the bank’s obligation to pay on the LOC, the primary focus of a performance bond is
the effective accomplishment of the work. The two instruments also differ with respect
to their effect on the contractor’s borrowing capacity and the prequalification process. In
order to issue an LOC, the bank always requires the contractor to pledge specific assets to
be paid in case of insolvency. An LOC thus diminishes the contractor’s line of credit and
appears on financial statements as a contingent liability. The bank examines the quality and
liquidity of the asset by checking whether it could back up the debt; if this is the case, no
19Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 28.
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further prequalification is required. Hence, a bank issuing an LOC takes no risk and has no
incentive to screen the contractor, whose liquidity is reduced to back up the LOC. Should
the applicant be unable to make payment on the purchase, it shall cover the outstanding
amount. In contrast, performance bonds are issued on an unsecured basis and neither alter
firms’ assets nor diminish the contractor’s borrowing capacity; in other words, the surety
bears part of the project risk. In order to ensure the delivery of the contract object in case of
contractor’s default the surety has to choose between the following: (i) covering production
costs by itself and allowing the contractor to finish the works; (ii) selecting a new contractor
to conclude the residual tasks; or, only as a last resort, (iii) refunding the bond value to the
buyer, leaving the execution incomplete.
These crucial differences imply that an LOC is likely to be unavailable to companies
with few assets, which excludes them from participating in the tender and thus reduces
competition on dimensions not related to quality. Since sureties, which must have sufficient
assets to back up the bonds they issue, are partially responsible for the completion of the
works, they have strong incentives to properly screen potential contractors and to assess
their ability to execute the job. This point crucially inspired our work. Ceteris paribus, a
bonded project is more likely to be completed in accordance with the contract provisions as
the likelihood of contractor default or any breach of procurement contract clauses is reduced,
while the awarding price may be higher due to a premium.
Performance bonds are required for US Government procurement by the Miller Act.20
The Act applies only to contracts awarded for the construction, alteration, or repair of
any public building (for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to this subset of contracts as
constructions henceforth) of the U.S. federal government. The Miller Act imposes that,
in order to be allowed to participate in the tender, potential contractors must furnish the
federal government with a performance bond pre-approval. Typically, the performance bond
amounts to the 100 percent of the contract price.21 Throughout this paper we refer to the
2040 U.S.C. sections 3131-3134
21Contractors are free to choose their own surety from a list of financial companies which the U.S. Depart-
ment of Treasury establishes as qualified to underwrite performance bonds on federal government projects.
This certificate of authority also determines the amount of the maximum limits of coverage for each of these.
In other words, a surety that wants to issue bonds for federal government construction projects is in turn
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performance bonding as private oversight.
Public Oversight The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the guidebook governing
the public procurement process in the U.S., provides a set of rules that contracting offices are
to comply with during both the awarding phase and the operation phase of the acquisition.
Following Calvo, Cui and Serpa (2016), and as opposed to the above presented private
counterpart, we refer to these formal background rules collectively as public oversight.
Contracting officers are required by the FAR to use one of the two following formal
solicitation methods when acquiring supplies or services: sealed bidding or negotiation. They
involve six and nine formal steps, respectively, each requiring a series of checks on bidders’
documentation enacted by the contracting officer before awarding the contract - i.e., ex-
ante.22 Moreover, during the operational stage - i.e., ex-post - contracting officers require
sellers to complete expenditure justification forms and submit cost/pricing data (in order
to certify that expenses are based on adequate price competition); eventually, sellers must
submit reports on project progresses to specific evaluation teams.23
II.2 Simplified Acquisition Procedures
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act The Simplified Acquisition Procedures, intro-
duced with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, aim at reducing the adminis-
trative burden for the sellers, mainly small businesses, when working for the Government.24
Under the simplified acquisitions, federal buyers need not allocate time and resources to the
formal acquisition procedures described above - i.e., they do not have to exert any public
oversight.25 Contracting officers are encouraged to use the simplified acquisitions, and thus
subject to a financial review that officially sets its bond size limit.
22Refer to the appendix, section A.3, for a detailed review of the procedures.
23The number and type of checks are similar for each contracting office, as provided by the FAR, and their
scope is analogous; we can coherently group them into one set.
24FAR part 13.
25There are five buying methods prescribed in FAR Part 13 for simplified acquisition purchases. The
two major methods are Purchase Orders and Blunket Purchase Agreements. A Purchase Order (FAR Part
13.302) is a commercial document issued by a buyer to a seller, indicating types, quantities, and agreed prices
for products or services the seller will provide to the buyer. Sending a PO to a supplier constitutes a legal offer
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to exempt contractors from public oversight, to the maximum extent practicable for pur-
chases of supplies or services whose anticipated dollar value does not exceed a monetary
cutoff - the Simplified Acquisition Threshold.26 The private oversight (i.e., the performance
bonding) applies above the same cutoff and, for the sake of convenience, we refer to a single
oversight threshold for the implementation of both regulations. More specifically, a contrac-
tor awarded a construction (non-construction) project whose anticipated value lies above the
oversight threshold is subject to both public and private oversight (public oversight only).
Exogenous Variation We exploit a change in the oversight threshold that was enacted in
October, 2010, to inform our identification strategy. The 41 USC 1908 requires the govern-
ment to review the acquisition-related thresholds every five years - for inflation. Notably, “to
review” does not necessarily imply “to adjust”: the choice to move thresholds depends on
several factors other than the change of the Consumer Price Index in the previous five years,
including political and economic considerations. The law applied to both the simplified ac-
quisitions and the Miller Act provisions through an update of the oversight threshold, which
was raised from $100,000 to $150,000 on October 1, 2010.27 The same thresholds, although
reviewed in accordance with the law provisions, were not changed in 2005 and 2015.
Figure (1) provides a stylized timeline of the outlined framework. Left panel represents
the fiscal years 2005-201028 for construction and all other contracts (“non-construction”
from now on), right panel refers to the period 2011-2015, for the same contracts. The
horizontal dotted line represents the oversight threshold, moving upward as of FY 2011;
to buy products or services. Acceptance of a PO by a seller usually forms a one-off contract between the buyer
and seller, so no contract exists until the purchase order is accepted. A Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA)
is a simplified method of filling anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or services by establishing “charge
accounts” with qualified contractors. BPAs should be established for use by an organization responsible for
providing supplies for its own operations or for other offices, installations, projects, or functions. The use
of BPAs does not exempt an agency from the responsibility for keeping obligations and expenditures within
available funds and executed in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 8.405-3.
26Indeed, according to the FAR, the purpose of the Simplified Acquisition Procedures is to reduce admin-
istrative costs, improve opportunities for small and disadvantaged businesses to obtain a fair proportion of
government contracts, promote efficiency and economy in contracting; and avoid unnecessary burdens for
agencies and contractors.
27The adjustment is rounded - in the case of a dollar threshold that is not less than $100,000, but is less
than $1,000,000 - to the nearest $50,000.
28Fiscal year 2010 ends on October, 2010. The threshold revision was enforced from fiscal year 2011 on.
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Table 1: Reform Timing
Pre-2011 Post-2011
Construction Non-Construction Construction Non-Construction
Private and Public Public Private and Public Public
Above $150k Oversight Oversight Oversight Oversight
Private and Public Public
$100-150k Oversight Oversight None None
Below $100k None None None None
Notes: Contracts subject to (gray) and exempted from oversight before and after October, 2010. The
$100,000-150,000 class (grid) identifies the treatment group, i.e., those contracts subject to oversight before
but not after the reform. Upper control group - “Above $150k” - includes contracts always exposed to
oversight (i.e., always gray, both construction and non-construction) while the lower control group - “Below
$100k” - consists of contracts never exposed (always white).
the grid identifies awarded contracts worth $100,000 to $149,999, while the background
colors refer to oversight application (gray, dark and pale) or exemption (white). In the
case of construction contracts, the exemption included both public and private oversight,
while for non-construction the exemption was from public oversight only. Over the time
span considered, construction contracts valued above $150,000 (below $100,000) are always
(never) subject to private and public oversight, while non-construction contracts of the same
amount are subject to (exempted from) public oversight only.
III Theoretical Background
While helping to scrutinize among potential contractors and to restrain vendors’ misconduct,
public oversight introduces a burden in terms of both time and cost due its intrinsic char-
acteristics. In order to comply with solicitation rules and produce the required paperwork,
sellers must divert resources away from contract-specific tasks, and their leeway is hampered
by the need for public approval. This is extensively recognized by FAR itself when introduc-
ing the simplified acquisition procedures.29 To sum up, enforcing public oversight may lead
29The purpose of FAR part 13 is to prescribe simplified acquisition procedures in order to i) reduce ad-
ministrative costs; ii) improve opportunities for small, small disadvantaged, women-owned, veteran-owned,
12
to two conflicting phenomena:
 Hypothesis a.1) : The introduction of an unnecessary bureaucratic burden for con-
tracting parties causes longer delays and higher costs - red tape effect ;30
 Hypothesis a.2) : formal solicitations procedures reduce discretion of contracting of-
ficers at the award phase and project supervision reduces the risk and the extent of
opportunism, slack conduct or misbehavior in contract execution - public adverse se-
lection and moral hazard effect.31
An ex-ante assessment of the effect of public oversight on contractors’ performance is not
trivial. On the one hand, the two effects are competing;32 on the other hand, both might be
non-linear in the contract amount - monitoring might be a wasteful activity only for small
projects, and could lead to savings for larger ones.
On top of public oversight, firms competing for federal construction contracts are also
required to obtain performance bonds and be subject to private oversight. This entails
oversight exerted by private companies, i.e the sureties. In turn, the effect of performance
bonding on contract outcomes may have two sources:
 Hypothesis b.1): firms subject/not subject to Miller Act provisions are structurally
different due to the screening effect induced by sureties - private adverse selection
effect ;
 Hypothesis b.2): as for public oversight, being covered and monitored by a surety gives
firms more incentives to complete contracts under the terms and conditions agreed -
private moral hazard effect.
HUBZone, and service-disabled veteran-owned small business concerns to obtain a fair proportion of Gov-
ernment contracts; iii) promote efficiency and economy in contracting; and iv) avoid unnecessary burdens
for agencies and contractors.
30See Bozeman (1993) for a review of the theory of red tape and public contracting.
31See Spiller (2008) for the theory on public contracts and opportunism; see also Decarolis, Pacini and
Spagnolo (2016).
32Identifying the extent to which the red tape and the moral hazard effects induced by the public oversight
interact and affect the contract outcomes goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Hypothesis b.1) is the one proposed by Calveras, Ganuza and Hauk (2004) (CGH hence-
forth), according to which we should observe a different pool of winning firms before and
after the reform.33 Specifically, since sellers are no longer subject to the pre-bidding screen-
ing process, we should observe a high turnover rate between firm types. After the reform,
low-quality firms are supposed to be more likely to win at the expense of the good types
given that their low quality does not reflect on higher premia charged by sureties anymore.34
Thus we would expect more bad-type contractors to enter the pool of winners, good types
to exit and the quality of the average contract outcome to decline accordingly. Hypothesis
b.2) underlies a different prediction on the pool of winning firms. The assumption that
surety companies do not screen potential contractors through a premium discrimination im-
plies that we should not observe any significant change in the composition and structure of
awarded firms after the reform. In such a framework, what matters instead is that removing
performance bonds reduces the incentives for the same firms to exert the effort required to
accomplish the contract tasks. To guarantee contract completion, sureties check the status
of works and evaluate contractors’ performance. In their absence, an issue of moral hazard
arises and contractors tend to perform worse.
Hypotheses b.1) and b.2) are not competing and we expect both to be relevant in the
public procurement market. The role designed by the law for surety companies is meant to
minimize both effects through an ex-ante and ex-post monitoring of contractors. The overall
effect of private oversight on contract outcomes amounts to the sum of selection, monitoring
and the interactions of the two, and we expect it to be positive in terms of contract outcomes.
33The FPDS-NG only reports tender winners. Indeed, according to hypothesis b.1), the pool of potential
contractors does not necessarily change with or without screening.
34In CGH terms limited liability companies are more willing to bid aggresively and, ultimately, face risks
and an unexpected need to revise contract terms.
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IV Data
IV.1 FPDS Dataset
The data we use are sourced from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), a database
to which federal contracting officers in the U.S. must submit complete reports on procurement
contract actions, as required by the FAR. It contains all contracts, both supply- and service-
based, that have been awarded by the U.S. government and exceed an individual transaction
value of $2,500, as well as every following activity.35 The dataset also includes several
variables related to the transaction itself, including buyer and seller characteristics in addition
to solicitation and contract information, such as the signature, award and insertion dates,
the contract object and its category (i.e., service or supply).
Importantly, we observe the type of solicitation procedures used, which reveals whether
a contract is awarded through Simplified Acquisition Procedures (i.e., no oversight) or other
procedures (sealed bidding or negotiation). Using this information, we build the binary vari-
able SAPi, indicating whether contract i has been waived from public and private oversight
or not. The SAP variable crucially supports our identification strategy: ideally, we would
like to observe the engineers’ estimated value (EVi), which is the piece of information used
by the contracting office to assign the public oversight treatment to a contract. However,
this is not recorded into FPDS and we are able to overcome the issue only combining infor-
mation provided by i) SAP , that is we identify contracts exempted from public and private
oversight, and ii) the ex-post contract value.36 The version of FPDS employed dates back to
September, 30 2015.
35Data are gathered by contracting offices in 23 agencies. In Tables (A.3) and (A.4) we report the number
of contracts per agency/year.
36Consider two contracts, A and B, whose observed contract value is $105,000, both awarded before the
threshold revision. However, the unobservable engineers’ estimated value of A, EVA, is $110,000, while
EVB = $95, 000. According to the contract value, they are both subject to oversight. However, exploiting
the fact that SAPA = 0 and SAPB = 1, we can proceed to the correct identification and avoid any source
of bias in the estimates.
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IV.2 Data Management
We split the data into two main groups: contracts and amendment records. The former
refer to the first transaction between a procurer and a vendor and correspond to our unit of
observation, whose reported characteristics represent the benchmark procurement agreement
information. The latter account for all the revisions, modifications or corrections to existing
contracts. Each contract is identified through a unique ID which is used to mark all its present
and future alterations; therefore, we are able to track the entire contract history and link
each contract to its revisions. Amendment records are classified according to the reason for
contract modification, which is reported alongside the extra cost and time taken to complete
the works. We further group them into in-scope or out-of-scope revisions, depending on
whether the goal of the amendment is consistent with the initial contract terms.37 We use
the in-scope amendments to build the outcome measures of our empirical analysis presented
below.38
Performance Indexes First, we define: i) Time Overrun, representing the days in excess
of a project’s initial deadline; measured as the difference between the actual completion
date and the estimated one and ii) Cost Overrun, standing for the expenses in excess of a
project’s initial budget; it is the sum - in thousands of dollars - of all renegotiated amounts.
Time Overrun and Cost Overrun are widely used proxies for contractual performance;39
however, there are circumstances in which renegotiating the contract terms leads to optimal
outcomes - typically, this is the case for complex, structured projects likely to be subject to
unexpected events (negative cost shocks, adverse natural conditions, etc.). Given high-value
37According to the FPDS data dictionary, we label as out-of-scope all amendments classified as “Additional
Work (new agreement, FAR part 6 applies)”, “Novation Agreement”, “Vendor DUNS or name change - Non-
Novation” and “Vendor Address Change”. We consider all other amendments as being within the scope of
the project.
38Before initiating a modification, the contracting officer must determine if the proposed effort is within
the scope of the existing contract or is a new acquisition outside of the scope. A new requirement outside of
the scope of the existing contract must be processed as a new acquisition. Contract scope means, in simple
terms, that the contemplated change must be generally related to the work originally contracted for. If a
contract was awarded for the design (and only the design) of an automated information system, it could not
be later modified to have the contractor provide and install hardware.
39Among the others, see Lewis and Bajari (2017), Coviello, Guglielmo and Spagnolo (2017), Decarolis
(2014) and Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2008).
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contracts are the minority in our sample, and according to Spiller (2008), who argues that
renegotiations are suboptimal in the public procurement context, we consider the measures
built on in-scope amendments only to adequately reflect the performance of a contractor.40
In order to compare the two overrun measures with the initial expected outcomes - that
is, the time/cost of completion specified in the contract terms - we specify two indexes for
contract performance like:41
performanceig =
expected outcomeig
expected outcomeig + overrunig
where i refers to the contract and g = [time, cost]. By construction, it maps the cou-
ple [expected outcomeig ; overrunig] to the interval [0, 1], with an increasing performance
approaching 1, that is in the case of no overruns. Not surprisingly, the two performance
measures are positively correlated (50 percent).42
Also, we build two binary variables indicating whether the contract terms have been
amended, that is at least one modification follows the initial contract signature in terms of
completion time (Time Amended) or final cost (Cost Amended).
We also store the average amount of time (Average Time Overrun) and cost (Average
Cost Overrun) overruns - i.e.,
∑K
k=1 amount amendedi,k
number amendmentsi
, where i stands for the contract and k the
amendment. These variables are defined only for the subset of contracts subject to at least
one revision.
The FPDS dataset includes a number of other variables from which we build the controls
40Spiller (2008)’s argument unfolds as follows: given the formal, bureaucratic nature of public contracting,
any terms renegotiation would add adjustment costs, providing weaker incentives to adapt for both con-
tractors and public authorities. Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2014) provide support to this hypothesis by
quantifying in 8 to 14 percent of the winning bid the adaptation costs in their construction data.
41The two performance measures are positively correlated (48 percent). This feature of our data differs
from that in Decarolis (2014), who finds a nearly zero correlation between time and cost renegotiations and
no evidence of a nonlinear relationship. He stresses, however, that designing the contract in such a way that
the contractor would be in charge of both the design and the execution of the project would lead to shorter
time and greater cost overruns. We are not able to reproduce his results since the FPDS does not contain
such information.
42Figure (A.9) in the appendix is a scatterplot showing the correlation between cost performance and time
performance.
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in our regressions. SAP is a binary variable indicating whether the contract has been subject
to the Simplified Acquisition Procedures; Constr is an indicator for construction contracts;
Fixed Price indicates whether contracts are priced with a fixed price or cost plus format -
i.e., if the supplier is paid a fixed amount, regardless of costs incurred, or if is entitled to
obtain compensation in proportion to its costs plus a mark-up; Small is an indicator for
small business vendor;43; Negotiation is a dummy variable for contracts awarded through
negotiated procedures; and Bureau Size, which is the cumulative value of contracts a bureau
has awarded in the current year for the same service or construction category.
IV.3 Sample Selection
We restrict our sample to those contracts awarded through competitive solicitations because
the effect of the treatments would otherwise not be observable.44 For similar reasons, we
focus on contracts whose tasks are such that the vendor can influence the outcome metrics
through effort. Supply contracts do not allow for renegotiations. Hence, for these contracts
our measure of performance does not proxy outcome quality whatsoever and we exclude
them from the analysis.45 The same rationale applies to the service subcategory “Lease or
Rental of Equipment, Structures, or Facilities”.46 In order to keep a balanced time-window
around the SAT update, we rule out observations before January, 1, 2005, and cover the
years 2005 to 2015. We eliminate contracts whose expected termination date is beyond the
date of data download - September 30, 2015 - to keep only completed projects. We also
drop contracts related to certain commercial items that make use of simplified procedures
for the acquisition of services for amounts greater than the oversight threshold. This cleaning
43The Small Business Authority (SBA) labels small firms based on the particular service category which
the contract belongs to, and on sellers’ characteristics (revenues, number of employees, etc).
44We consider as competitive a lot for which the extent of competition is labelled “Full and open” and whose
participation is not set aside to any specific group of firms. In non-competitive tenders, the participation
criteria restrict the competition ex-ante to dimensions other than quality (e.g. Athey, Levin and Seira (2011))
45The typical supply contract shows a 0 value in time/cost overruns and a unit value in both performances.
46Services included in the sample are: Special Studies/Analysis, Not R&D; Architect and Engineering
Services; Information Technology and Telecommunications; Purchase of Structures/Facilities; Natural Re-
sources Management; Social; Quality Control, Testing, and Inspection; Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding
of Equipment; Modification of Equipment; Technical Representative; Operation of Structures/Facilities; In-
stallation of Equipment; Salvage; Medical; Support (Professional/Administrative/Management); Utilities
and Housekeeping; Photo/Map/Print/Publication; Education/Training; Transportation/Travel/Relocation.
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process yields a sample of 226,161 contracts and 23,870 unique firms .47
Two sets of contracts - the two solid colored sections in Figure (1) - are potential can-
didates for use as control groups: the “always exposed” set (upper control group) and the
“never exposed” set (lower control group). The reform date and the two treatments cluster
the sample into 6 distinct groups: the treatment group, counting all contracts - constructions
included - valued between $100,000 and $149,999 that are subject to public oversight before
but not after the reform; upper and lower control groups, consisting of all contracts valued
more than $150,000 or less than $100,000, respectively; and construction treatment, upper
and lower control subgroups, including construction contracts only, subject to private as well
public oversight, with the same monetary cutoffs.
In Table (2) we report summary statistics for the Service treatment group and upper
control group, both before and after the reform.
V Empirical Analysis
In this section, we first explain the econometric strategy used to identify the effect of private
oversight and public oversight. Then, we present the estimation results and the relative
robustness checks.
V.1 Identification strategy
We shall exploit the threshold adjustment in order to separately identify the effect on perfor-
mances of public oversight and private oversight exemption. In principle, we would want to
randomly assign the provisions across solicitations and perform a pairwise comparison of the
average outcomes of the groups in the two cases. In the absence of a controlled randomized
trial, we are forced to turn to non-experimental methods that mimic it under reasonable
conditions.
47The firm ID variable is missing in approximately 57 percent of the contracts in our sample.
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Table 2: Summary statistics - Service sample
Upper Control Group
Before After
Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N
Time Performance 0.7 0.3 0.74 51,245 0.7 0.3 0.82 52,737
Num Time Amendments 2.4 2.8 1 51,245 1.4 2.1 0 52,737
Prob Time Revision 0.6 0.5 1 51,245 0.6 0.5 1 52,737
Avg Time Overrun 199.4 252.3 128.6 27,887 214.0 287.9 115.6 22,684
Cost Performance 0.7 0.3 0.91 51,245 0.8 0.3 0.98 52,737
Num Cost Amendments 2.8 3.2 2 51,245 1.8 2.6 1 52,737
Prob Cost Revision 0.6 0.5 1 51,245 0.5 0.5 1 52,737
Avg Cost Overrun 273.8 333.5 205.1 31,587 307.8 413.7 176.8 27,481
Contract Value 1,896.8 9,311.5 421.7 51,245 1,098.6 4,334.6 300 52,737
# Contractual Days 417.6 404.5 364 51,245 305.1 222.1 357 52,737
Offers received 5.4 18.7 2 51,245 5.7 18.7 2 52,737
Treatment Group
Before After
Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N
Time Performance 0.8 0.3 1 13,774 0.8 0.3 1 2,061
Num Time Amendments 1.1 2.0 0 13,774 0.7 1.5 0 2,061
Prob Time Revision 0.4 0.5 0 13,774 0.3 0.5 0 2,061
Avg Time Overrun 229.9 287.3 141 4,763 187.6 250.5 100 565
Cost Performance 0.8 0.3 1 13,774 0.9 0.2 1 2,061
Num Cost Amendments 1.3 2.3 0 13,774 0.8 1.7 0 2,061
Prob Cost Revision 0.4 0.5 0 13,774 0.3 0.5 0 2,061
Avg Cost Overrun 101.2 125.9 64.2 5,377 67.5 96.7 34.1 625
Contract Value 122.2 15.2 121.2 13,774 122.0 16.1 120.1 2,061
# Contractual Days 298.9 342.8 215 13,774 228.2 191.1 205 2,061
Offers received 4.7 14.5 2 13,774 3.9 18.9 1 2,061
Notes: the table reports descriptive statistics for both the upper control group (above panel) and the
treatment group (below panel), before (left side) and after (right side) the threshold revision. Time and Cost
Performance are relative measures of performance - bounded 0 to 1; Num Time and Num Cost Amendments
count the number of amendments per contract, while the relative Prob is a binary variable that takes value
1 in case of any amendment occurs; Avg Time and Avg Cost Overrun account for the average extra time or
extra cost and is defined only for contracts which had at least one amendment; Contract Value is expressed
in US$ thousands; Offers Received report the number of offers received per tender.
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Construction contracts above the oversight threshold are exposed to both public and pri-
vate oversight, while non-construction contracts are subject only to public oversight. Hence,
the grid in Figure (1) identifies the treatment group: for construction contracts, the treat-
ment results in exemption from both types of oversight, while for non-construction it is the
exemption from public oversight only. Sections without grids identify upper (gray) and lower
(white) control groups. We start by considering all contracts and present a plain difference-
in-differences (DD) strategy. We then focus on the construction/non-construction distinction
and discuss how to nest two DD analyses through the difference-in-difference-in-differences
(DDD, or triple difference) approach.
The simplest framework for a DD estimation requires a set of individuals observed over
two periods. A subset of observations - the treatment group - is exposed to a treatment
in the second period; the other subset - the control group - is never exposed. Measuring
the difference in the average outcome between the groups, while keeping everything else
constant, yields the average treatment effect on the treated. The underlying assumption,
which crucially informs the DD identification, states that the difference in expected outcome
between the groups is constant across periods, conditional on observables; in other words,
one assumes the trends of the variable of interest in the two groups would have been parallel
had the treatment not occurred. In our setting, the contract is the unit of observation, the
treatment is the waiver of oversight, the periods are determined according to the reform
date, and the groups are defined as above. To verify whether the parallel trend assumption
is reasonable in our data, we plot the yearly average time series of time performance and
cost performance for the Service treatment and both control groups in Figure (1).48 The
trends appear to be parallel throughout the pre-treatment period.
If the parallel trends assumption holds, it is then possible to identify the average treat-
ment effect on the treated by running a linear regression:
Yit = β1D1it + β2D2it + θa(D1it ∗D2it) + it (1)
48Cost performance shows a sharp increase in both the treatment and the control groups. This is possibly
due to the presence of incomplete contracts in our sample when approaching the date of download. We show
that the results are robust to the narrowing of the estimation time window.
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Figure 1: Time and Cost Performance: Yearly Averages
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Notes: Trends in yearly averages of Time Performance (above panels) and Cost Performance (below panels)
for treatment, upper and lower control groups. Left panels refer to the service contract sample, right panels
to the constructions sample. The vertical line corresponds to October, 2010.
where D1it and D2it are binary indicators for group (treatment/control) and period
(before/after), respectively. The term (D1it∗D2it) identifies the treatment and its parameter
θˆa amounts to the average treatment effect on the treated. In our setting, in which one
treatment is nested onto the other, however, θˆa is biased and the very definition of treatment
is ambiguous, as it encompasses effect of the waiver of both public and private oversight.
The latter is relevant to treated construction contracts only, but its effect is estimated jointly
on the whole sample and cannot be disentangled via a plain DD.
In order to deal with two nested treatments, we rely on an augmented version of the
DD. The triple differences approach nests two DD models like (1) in a single equation and,
controlling for the relative differences between treatment and control groups, consistently
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estimates the average treatment effects.49 Specifically, starting from equation (1) we define
D3 as an indicator variable for the subset of individuals subject to the second treatment and
augment the model with another tier of differences:
Yit = α + β1D1it + β2D2it + θa(D1it ∗D2it) + β3D3it+
+ β4(D1it ∗D3it) + β5(D2it ∗D3it) + θb(D1it ∗D2it ∗D3it) + it
(2)
In equation (2) the triple interaction term (D1it ∗ D2it ∗ D3it) marks the individuals
subject to both treatments. In our framework, the coefficients of interest θi, i ∈ [a, b] capture
the effect of the waiver of both types of oversight. As in the case of the plain DD, these are
identified as the difference between the observed effects of treatment on the treated and the
counter-factual outcome in the absence of treatment, which is assumed to be parallel to that
of the control group.
Intensive margin We treat our data as a pooled cross-section and use upper control group
in the baseline and main robustness specifications.50 In the core analysis of the paper, we
examine the treatment effects on the intensive margin; more specifically, we estimate a DDD
on cost and time performance metrics. Indicating the contract outcome variable by Yijt, we
specify the following linear equation:
Yijt = α + β1Waiverit + β2Postit + θpublic (Waiverit ∗ Postit) +
+ β3Constrit + β4 (Constrit ∗Waiverit) + β5 (Constrit ∗ Postit) +
+ θprivate (Waiverit ∗ Postit ∗ Constrit) + γXit + ζj + δt + εijt
(3)
where i refers to the contract, j is the contracting office and t indicates the year. Waiverit
is the binary variable marking whether the contract value lies within the treatment band,
49See Berck and Villas-Boas (2016), among others, for further details.
50The population of construction contracts always subject to both public and private oversight.
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i.e. oversight FY2005-2010, no oversight FY2011-2015 - and captures differences between the
treatment and control groups prior to the policy change.51 Postit is a dummy variable for
contracts awarded after the reform and captures aggregate factors that would cause changes
in Yijt even in the absence of a policy change and the interaction term Waiverit ∗ Postit
captures the effect of exempting contracts from public oversight. Constri is a binary indicator
for construction works and the triple interaction term Waiverit ∗ Postit ∗Constrit indicates
the construction contracts subject to private oversight.52 Finally, Xit are contract- and
contractor-specific characteristics at the time of the award and ζj and δt are contracting
office and year fixed effects, respectively. The coefficients of interest are θpublic, representing
the average treatment effect of the exemption from public oversight, and θprivate, capturing
the effect of the exemption from private oversight.
In order to fully characterize the treatment effects on the treated, we will analyze both the
intensive margin - the total and average amount - and the extensive margin - the probability
- of contract amendment. This approach is crucial to unveil the channels through which
contractual performance is affected by the reform.
Extensive margin The triple difference analysis identifies the treatment effects on the
intensive margin of outcome measures. In order to fully describe the causal effects of the
treatments on the performance, we need to investigate whether treated firms are more likely
to renegotiate. More specifically, we are interested in assessing the treatment effects on the
probability of amending the contract terms. When not being monitored, firms have more
discretionary power during job planning and execution. On the other hand, this leaves room
for opportunistic incentives in contract revisions and they may find it more convenient to
bargain with the public administration more often at lower amounts. We expect this effect
to be even stronger in the construction industry, where the decision to renegotiate with
the sponsor must be arranged with the surety, and represents a last resort for contractors.
Any minor issue in terms of costs or time could be managed by the surety itself. Hence,
51Specifically, Waiverit is the interaction between the binary variable indicating whether the contract
value lies between 100,000 and 150,000$ and SAP as defined in section IV.2
52In terms of equation (2), Waiverit corresponds to D1it, Postit to D2it and Constrit to D3, respectively.
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in the absence of private oversight, contract revisions become a viable option to overcome
unexpected shocks.
We will test these conjectures running a DDD regression of Time Amended and Cost
Amended on treatments and controls. The above premises underlie a second set of conjec-
tures regarding the intensive margin of amendments. If sureties handle minor issues and
help contractors to overcome them without contract revisions, we would expect the average
overrun to be higher in their presence, since otherwise the sponsor itself has to take care
of minor issues. Hence, we proceed with a DDD analysis of the average overrun - Average
Time Overrun and Average Cost Overrun - only for those contracts subject to at least one
amendment.
Identification issues and data features The chief concern in our empirical framework
is that, as already mentioned in section IV.1, we do not explicitly observe the engineers’ esti-
mated value (EVi). Since we rely on a combination of i) SAP, identifying contracts without
public oversight, and ii) their award value, we cannot identify the lower bound of treated
contracts: this exposes our treatment group sample to the risk of spurious contamination.
When testing for robustness of our results, we show that the contract award amount is a good
proxy of the engineers’ estimate and that the misclassification of contracts to the treatment
group is residual.
A very nice feature of our data is that we can run the model on two equally valid sets of
control groups: switching from one to the other, as long as the parallel trends assumption
holds, should not alter the DDD estimates. In fact, as shown in section V.3, our results
are robust to the choice of either group. Finally, it is crucial to remark that contractors
decide whether to participate in the tenders and the choice to be subject to the treatment
is endogenous. On top of that, the surety company exerts an ex-ante selection on potential
contractors, affecting the pool of winners on the quality dimension (see section VI for further
details). For all these reasons, a regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach is not a
viable option. In order to test for endogenous sorting or discontinuities in the forcing variable,
we performed the McCrary (2008) density test for post-law data (see Figure (A.3)). The
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sharp discontinuity of the running variable at the threshold, highlighted by the graph and
confirmed by the highly significant test results, rules out any possibility of running a usual
RDD with our data; see Appendix for further details.
V.2 Results
Triple difference Table (3) reports the DDD regression of contract outcomes - time perfor-
mance in panel (a) and cost performance in panel (b) - on the treatment variables as defined
in equation (3). Column 1 reports results of a triple difference model based on equation (3)
with no further controls. Specifications 2 to 5 saturate the model by iteratively including
controls plus an increasing number of fixed effects (bureau, year, state, and contract cate-
gory). To deal with a collection of minor problems about normality, heteroscedasticity or
observations that exhibit large residuals, leverage or influence, standard errors are estimated
using the Eicker-Huber-White estimator.53
The public oversight treatment (θˆpublic) is robust to the choice of controls and fixed effects.
However, adding bureau fixed effects - column 3 - seems to have significant effects on the
magnitude of estimates. Similarly, the effect of private oversight waiver (θˆprivate) is boosted
and becomes statistically significant once accounting for bureau specific features. This is not
surprising: as shown in Section VI, persistency of the bureau’s performance matters in terms
of contract outcomes. On the other hand, controlling for year (column 4), state (column 5)
or object fixed effects does not alter results substantially.
Our baseline estimates, in column 5, show that waiving public oversight positively affects
contract performance, but the absence of private oversight offsets such gains. Specifically, we
find that the waiver of public oversight effect is positive both in terms of time performance
(+7.2 percent) and cost performance (+5.3 percent). On the other hand, removing private
oversight worsens both measures of performance: it leads to a 9 percent decrease in terms of
time performance and to a 4.2 percent decrease in terms of cost performance. The composite
53Standard errors estimates are robust to various choices of clusterization level. In Table (A.8) we report
the estimated parameters of the baseline model for both Time Performance and Cost Performance with
standard errors clustered at different levels.
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effect is ambiguous and depends on the dimension considered. The upward shift of the
oversight threshold produces an overall decrease in time performance (-1.8 percent) and a
slight increase in cost performance (+0.6 percent).54
Extensive and Intensive Margin In Table (4) we present the estimated treatment effect
on the extensive margin for time/cost outcomes and confront them with the intensive margin
of overrun - i.e., the treatment effect on the average overrun. Odd columns report the
results of a linear probability model on an indicator function for amendment while even
columns report the estimates of a DDD - equation (2) - on the average overrun. The model
employed for each regression includes all fixed effects and controls of column (5) in Table
(3). The probability of a time amendment falls in the treatment group (-5.2 percent), while
no significant effect is found for the construction treatment subgroup. Results are similar for
cost margin, with an estimated decline in the treatment group (-3.1 percent) and no effect in
the construction treatment subgroup. The intensive margin analysis yields a similar picture:
public oversight causes lower average overruns in terms of both time and cost (-57.5 days
and -$42,187, respectively), while private oversight leads to higher average time overruns
(+73.5 days) and lower cost overruns (-$67,807). The latter is in contrast with our baseline
finding on the private oversight impact on cost performance, although the effect is possibly
counterbalanced by the non-significance of the effect at the extensive margin. In words,
this implies that firms in the treatment group are less likely to revise contract terms and,
when they do, the overrun is less on both time and cost dimensions; instead, waiving private
oversight does not affect the likelihood of revision and has an opposite effect at the intensive
margin for cost and time dimensions.
V.3 Robustness Checks
We test the robustness of our baseline DDD findings over three dimensions. First, we check
whether the results are robust across different subsamples of contracts; second, we test the
54We calculate the percent change for constructions only, since both types of oversight apply to these
contracts.
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Table 3: Triple Difference - Contractual Performances
Panel (a): Time Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
θˆpublic 0.026 0.028 0.050 0.050 0.048
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
θˆprivate -0.001 0.004 -0.064 -0.066 -0.067
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
N 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089
R2 0.015 0.028 0.094 0.098 0.110
Avgservices 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763
Avgworks 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763
Panel (b): Cost Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
θˆpublic 0.018 0.016 0.039 0.039 0.045
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
θˆprivate -0.003 0.004 -0.028 -0.030 -0.037
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
N 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089
R2 0.036 0.120 0.184 0.189 0.206
Avgservices 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832
Avgworks 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.918
Controls X X X X
Bureau Fixed Effects X X X
State Fixed Effects X X
Object Fixed Effects X
Notes: results of the DDD regression of Time Performance - panel (a) - and Cost Performance - panel
(b) - on public oversight and private oversight treatment indicators. Column 1 reports the results of a
plain DDD regression, specification 2 adds controls for contract and bureau characteristics. Columns 3-5
include an increasing number of fixed effects (bureau, year, state, and contract object). To deal with a
collection of minor problems about normality, heteroscedasticity or observations that exhibit large residuals,
leverage or influence, standard errors are estimated using the Eicker-Huber-White estimators. In each panel,
Avgservices and Avgworks account for the average outcome in the Services and the Public Works treatment
group, respectively. Only coefficients related to treatment effects are reported. For the complete set of
regressions coefficients please refer to Tables (A.9) and (A.10).
suitability of the DDD empirical strategy in our framework; finally, we rule out the possibility
that our estimates of θprivate are driven by differential shocks in the construction industry.
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Table 4: Triple Difference - Contract Outcomes
Time Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
θˆpublic -0.052 -57.585 -0.030 -42.187
(0.014) (8.502) (0.018) (11.097)
θˆprivate 0.038 73.544 0.017 -67.807
(0.024) (24.612) (0.041) (21.274)
N 98,089 45,795 98,089 53,147
Notes: Time - columns (1)-(2) - and Cost - columns (3)-(4) - extensive and intensive margin analysis. For
each outcome, the odd column reports the results of a linear probability model of Time/Cost Amended on
public oversight and private oversight treatment indicators plus controls for firm size, tender type, whether
the firm is a limited liability company, whether the contract was signed during the last week of the fiscal
year, bureau, year, state, and contract object fixed effects. Even olumns report the estimates of a DDD with
the same set of controls on the Average Time/Cost Overrun.
Testing the sample selection We start the analysis by checking whether the estimated
parameters are robust to changes in the estimation sample. We are concerned, on the one
hand, that big contracts in the upper control group may drive the results and, on the other
hand, that there exist possible sources of contamination due to the unobserved engineers’
value: since we do not observe the ex-ante valuation of the project we may misclassify part
of the projects to the treatment/control groups.55 In Table (5), in columns 2 and 3 we
report the range and sanitary models, which restrict the sample to all contracts valued less
that $500,000 and exclude observations in a 10 percent window around the $100,000 and
$150,000 thresholds, respectively. In column 4, we take care of possible outliers in terms
of outcomes and exclude contracts that are associated to overruns worth nine times the
expected contract values (performance lower than 0.1) in terms of cost and time, separately.
In the appendix, we perform the same exercise when cost and time overrun exceed four times
the expected outcomes (i.e., performances < 0.25). In column 5 we show the results obtained
by running model (3) with the lower control group (i.e., all contracts valued between $50,000
55As remarked above, we only observe an indicator variable for the valuation being above or below the
threshold.
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and $100,000).
Table 5: Triple Difference - Sample Selection Robustness Checks
Panel (a): Time Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Range Sanitary Hperf Lower
θˆpublic 0.048 0.051 0.053 0.128 0.147
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.026)
θˆprivate -0.067 -0.064 -0.068 -0.035 -0.027
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.037) (0.037)
N 98,089 65,971 81,848 21,218 22,055
R2 0.110 0.111 0.108 0.124 0.128
Avgservices 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.833 0.802
Avgworks 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.821 0.828
Panel (b): Cost Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
θˆpublic 0.045 0.044 0.046 0.121 0.151
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.024) (0.027)
θˆprivate -0.037 -0.048 -0.038 -0.051 -0.055
(0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
N 98,089 65,971 81,848 21,455 22,055
R2 0.206 0.202 0.207 0.168 0.202
Avgservices 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.887 0.880
Avgworks 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.948
Notes: results of various DDD models of Time - panel (a) - and Cost - panel (b) - dimensions on public and
private oversight treatment indicators plus controls for firm size, tender type, whether the firm is a limited
liability company, whether the contract was signed during the last week of the fiscal year, bureau, year,
state, and contract object fixed effects. Base reports the baseline model results; Range reports results of the
above model run on a sample of contracts trimmed at a face value of $500,000; in Sanitary we account for
the possible contamination at the $100,000 and $150,000 thresholds dropping all contracts whose face value
lies within a 10 percent band around; HPerf indicates the exclusion of contracts with performance lower
than 0.1 Lower is run with the lower control group. In each panel, Avgservices and Avgworks account for the
average outcome in the Service and the Public Works treatment group, respectively.
Testing the empirical design The feasibility of the DDD analysis relies on a series of
assumptions that should be carefully analyzed. In particular, one should ensure that the
average outcome of the control and the treatment group hold parallel before the intervention
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date, as we show in Figure 1 for the present case in a way that the estimated treatment effect
should be zero before the treatment date. Following Autor (2003), we test this assumption
by running a model according to the following specification
yist =γs + δt +
q∑
j=−m
θpublic,jWaiverit+j + Constrit (4)
+
q∑
j=−m
θprivate,j(Waiver ∗ Constr)it+j +Xist + ist (5)
where γs and δt are Government bureau and fiscal year fixed effects, respectively, Xist
are contract-level controls and the specification includes m = 5 leads and q = 4 lags. A
graphical representation of the results is reported in Figure (2): we excluded t = −1 (i.e.,
the dummy relative to the FY 2010) in order to avoid collinearity issues and t? stands for
year = 2011. Although the results - mostly for time performance - appear to be noisy, there
is no clear evidence of non-parallel pre-trends and the public and private oversight effects
reflect the estimated parameters.
Another major concern when using the DD design is the possibility that estimates suffer
from the effects of confounding - and unobservable - factors changing over time. In this
sense, our estimates of public oversight may suffer from selection problem, as we consider all
contracts above (or below) the threshold as a unique control group. Given the heterogenous
nature of contracts within the control groups - they either range $150,000-695,000,000 or
$50,000-100,000 - and the panel dimension of our sample, it is possible to construct a finer
pool of controls through the synthetic control (SC) group approach, developed by Abadie,
Diamond and Hainmueller (2010), to remove arbitrariety in control group definition. In
order to do that, we first group upper and lower control groups together and partition them
in 68 groups according to the contract amount, then we build the SC group as the convex
combination of partitions that most closely resemble the treatment group in terms of pre-2011
outcomes and predictors.56 In Figure (3) we plot the treatment group (solid line) and SC
56SC builds upon the setting of the standard DD model, but makes two changes as i) it allows for time-
varying individual-specific heterogeneity and ii) it takes a data driven approach to forming counterfactuals,
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Figure 2: θˆpublic and θˆprivate - Time and Cost performance
−
.
2
0
.
2
−
.
2
0
.
2
t −6 t −5 t −4 t −3 t −2 t −1 t * t 2 t 3 t 4
Private Oversight Public Oversight
Time Performance
−
.
2
0
.
2
−
.
2
0
.
2
t −6 t −5 t −4 t −3 t −2 t −1 t * t 2 t 3 t 4
Private Oversight Public Oversight
Cost Performance
Notes: Leads and lags analysis of DDD for private and public oversight. We exclude t− 1 from the analysis.
Time (above panel) and cost performance (below panel).
i.e. selecting the control group. Rather than picking one of these two large control groups at a time, SC
creates an optimal weighted average of contracts above $150,000 and below $100,000. Each of the selected
group is associated to the respective weight. In the appendix - Figure (A.7) - we report all groups associated
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group (dotted line) yearly series for cost and time performance. The gross average difference
between treatment and SC groups are very close to the baseline DDD estimates for public
oversight, amounting to 0.053 (6.4 percent) and 0.046 (6 percent) for cost performance and
time performance, respectively. In order to evaluate the reliability of SC estimates, and to
test the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the optimal SC group, we run the inference
analysis proposed by Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) by checking whether we
would obtain the same results if we choose a group at random among the partitions. The
complete series of placebo tests is presented in Figure (4) alongside the actual treatment
group results: the exercise strongly supports the existence of a significant public oversight
treatment effect.
Figure 3: Synthetic Control Group - Parallel Trends
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Notes: Parallel trends in SC group analysis for public oversight - cost (above panel) and time performance
(below panel). The solid line is the treatment group, while the dotted line represents the SC group and is
the weighted average of 68 partitions of upper and lower control groups.
with non-zero weights, and their amount.
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Figure 4: Synthetic Control Group - Inferential analysis
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Notes: Inference in synthetic control group analysis for public oversight - cost (left panel) and time perfor-
mance (right panel). Estimated gaps in yearly-average cost performance and time performance between the
treatement group and all control groups. The idea of Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) is extend-
ing the idea of a placebo study to produce quantitative inference in comparative case studies. The idea of
the placebo test mimics the classic framework for permutation inference, where the distribution of a test
statistic is computed under random permutations of the sample units’ assignments to the intervention and
nonintervention groups. As in permutation tests, we apply the SC method to every potential control in our
donor sample. This allow to assess whether the effect estimated by the SC design for the group affected by
the intervention is large relative to the effect estimated for a group chosen at random.
Testing the “Differential Shock Hypothesis” Another concern in our setting is the
possibility that a shock hit the construction industry in FY2011 - and lasting for a long period
of time - and that the estimate of θprivate is thus capturing the time- and cost-dimension effects
on contract outcomes of such differential shock instead of an actual treatment effect.
In order to address such concern, we start by considering input prices that are typical of
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Figure 5: Input Prices Time Series - Constructions
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Notes: monthly time series of the construction input prices averaged over the US, 2005-2016. The red
vertical dashed line represents October, 2010.
construction industry and account for related observable shocks.57 In figure (5) we report
the monthly time series of the average prices of the main input for construction projects
- i.e., Cement, Insulation Materials, Asphalt Felts Coatings, Concrete, Construction Sand,
and ready-mix Concrete - ranging 2005-2016.58 Although quite stable on average, prices
follow different dynamics while the price of Asphalt Felts Coatings shows a clear jump in
2008, and kept being pretty noisy since then. In a related exercise, we run the model (3)
adding the full set of prices as additional controls. Estimated parameters, reported in Table
(6) - columns 2 and 5 - do not change with respect to the baseline results, showing a striking
robustness: in turn, this indicates that either input prices do not alter the likelyhood of
contractors to renegotiate ex-post, or that bidders include future input prices cost into their
bids ex-ante.
57The underlying assumption being that, if really unexpected, an input price shock may have dramatic
effects on renegotiations both in terms of time and costs.
58Prices are reported per unit. The unit is a standard measure and changes with the input considered
(e.g., the concrete’s standard unit is the cubic meter, while for the insulation materials is the square meter).
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The second step in order to rule out the possibility that our estimates pick up specific
differential shocks is testing whether our results are due to firms self-sorting in particular
markets (i.e., selection on observables). Hence, we follow a vast literature (see Abadie (2005)
and DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), among the others) in implementing a propensity
score (triple) differences estimator. Thanks to the richness of our data, we first estimate the
propensity score e(z), defined as the probability for a contract i of being in the treatment
group (Waiver = 1) conditional on a set of observables z unrelated to the outcomes of
interest.59 We then make use of the score to generate the weights wi = Waiveri + (1 −
Waiveri)
e(zi)
1−ei(z) as in Hirano and Imbens (2001), and proceed by estimating a weighted
version of equation (3). The estimated parameters account both for the transitory shocks
thanks to the balanced control/treatment groups and for the structural heterogeneity among
groups, which is differenced out by the difference-in-differences approach. In columns 3 and
6 of Table (6) we report the relative estimated parameters for time and cost performance,
respectively; while the sample is slightly reduced due to the lack of matches on observables
for some treated contracts, results appear to be extremely robust to the selection issue.
VI Discussion
Performance Bonding: Moral Hazard vs. Adverse Selection With the triple dif-
ference approach we are able to identify the net effect of performance bonding on contract
outcomes. However, the estimates alone do not help distinguish whether this is due to ad-
verse selection, to moral hazard, or to both. In order to test hypotheses b.1) and b.2), we
partition firms in the construction treatment subgroup into three clusters: Stayers - those
firms that win at least one contract both before and after October, 2010 within the treatment
band; Exiters that win at least one contract within the band before, but are not awarded a
contract worth less than $150,000 afterwards; and Entrants, which are never awarded a con-
tract worth more than $100,000 before the threshold revision, but win at least one contract
in the treatment band afterwards. Within the latter two clusters, we can further identify
59See Appendix for additional details on the model, variables used, and balancing test across treat-
ment/control groups.
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Table 6: Triple Difference - Differential Shocks Robustness Checks
Time Performance Cost Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base Input PSM Base Input PSM
θˆpublic 0.048 0.483 0.041 0.045 0.000 0.056
(0.011) (0.084) (0.013) (0.010) (0.076) (0.011)
θˆprivate -0.067 0.045 -0.059 -0.037 -0.032 -0.052
(0.027) (0.055) (0.043) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022)
N 98,089 22,055 96,077 98,089 22,055 97,345
R2 0.110 0.130 0.164 0.206 0.203 0.237
Avgservices 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.837 0.837 0.837
Avgworks 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.921 0.921 0.921
Notes: results of various DDD models of Time Performance - columns 1-3 - and Cost Performance - columns
4-6 - on public and private oversight treatment indicators plus controls for firm size, office size, tender type,
whether the contract format is a fixed price and bureau, year, state, and contract object fixed effects.
Columns 1 and 4 report baseline estimates. In columns 2 and 5 we add controls for construction input
prices, while columns 3 and 6 report estimates of the model weighted by the propensity score.
two subclusters: Segment Entrants (Segment Exiters) are those firms that enter (exit) the
treatment band after being awarded at least one contract below (above) $100,000 during the
pre-treatment period.
According to CGH (hypothesis b.1 ), the pool of winning firms must change with the
treatment. This would be reflected in a moderate share of Stayers and a high number of
both Exiters and Entrants. On top of that, the share of limited liability firms should be higher
in the pool of entrants, given that their aggressive bidding strategy is not counterbalanced by
higher surety premia.60 Conversely, hypothesis b.2) does not entail any structural adjustment
in the set of winning firms: according to this hypothesis sureties do not exert any ex-ante
screening and affect the outcomes only through the ex-post supervision of work progress. In
this scenario, the same firms are awarded contracts both before and after the reform but
their performance is negatively affected by the absence of the surety, whose monitoring role is
60Limited liability firms are able to bid more aggressively because their financial responsibility in case of
loss is bounded. For more details on this, see CGH.
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crucial to avoid misbehavior. Hence, we would expect to observe a relatively high number of
Stayers and a moderate or null turnover; moreover, Entrants and Exiters should be similar
in size and observable characteristics.
In Table (7), panel (a) reports summary statistics of each group within the PB treatment
group. The treated sample spans 2008-2013 with the treatment threshold fixed at October,
2010. In order to enhance comparability we repeat the exercise (panels b and c) on two
placebo subsamples spanning 5 years but not containing the threshold revision date - i.e., all
contracts before and all contracts after October, 2010. We place two placebo thresholds in
2008 and 2012, respectively. Stayers constitute 6.8 percent of the sample in the treatment
group - Panel (a) - while Entrants and Exiters account for 31.2 percent and 62 percent,
respectively. The Stayers figure is similar and remains low in all subsamples, this being an
indicator of a high turnover level in the market, but the proportion of exiters to entrants is
reversed in both panels (b) and (c) with respect to the treatment group.61 This indicates
that an unusually high number of firms exit the federal construction market following the
2011 reform - three times as many as those in the Placebo 1 subsample and almost 7 times
the number of Exiters in the Placebo 2 subsample - but are not replaced by a comparable
number of firms.62
An interesting piece of evidence in favor of the presence of adverse selection is provided by
the Segment Entrants and the Segment Exiters figures. The share of exiters is remarkably
regular across the three panels, lingering below the 5 percent.63 On the other hand, the
volume of Segment Entrants varies substantially, starting at similar levels before the reform
and increasing dramatically during treatment period (15 percent), only to decrease again (9
percent) afterwards. This is consistent with hypothesis b.1): a negligible share of firms step
up from below the $100,000 threshold to the treatment group when sureties screen bidders
ex ante, while the transition is relatively easy in their absence. We document an analogous
61See, for example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics on turnover levels at
http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag23.htm.
62Weighting the comparison for the ratio of total number of firms in the samples yields 2.45 and 4.57 times
more, respectively.
63We obtain similar results for segment Exiters with different placebo subsamples, where we define placebo
treatments according to different levels of contract value thresholds. Results are available from the authors
upon request.
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pattern in the share of entrant limited liability companies, which peaks during the treatment
period and decreases afterwards. Following CGH, we interpret this as a signal of adverse
selection.
Figure 6: θˆpublic on deciles of bureau performance
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Notes: DDD estimated βs on deciles of bureau performance for cost (left panel) and time performance (right
panel).
Public Monitoring: Competence and the Red Tape Effect In public procurement,
quality of buyers is a crucial feature to account for. Competence in providing goods and
services helps in selecting the best contractors, properly designing contracts and avoiding
misconduct. Moreover, high-quality officers might be able to minimize the red tape effect of
bureaucracy through rapid and efficient monitoring activities. Thus, we would expect the
public oversight treatment effect to be particularly intense in contracting offices with low
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Table 7: Summary statistics: Stayers, Entrants and Exiters in the Construction Market
Panel (a): Treated - 2011 Threshold
Stayers Entrants Exiters
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
No. of Employees 5,868.09 41.4 37 3,119.84 18 165 158.17 12 336
Annual Revenue 1,443.38 12.1 37 293.29 3.40 165 62.09 2.17 336
Limited Company 0.16 0 37 0.21 0 165 0.10 0 336
Past Time Perf e 0.79 0.80 37 0.80 0.80 161 0.82 0.83 334
Past Cost Perf e 0.90 0.92 37 0.87 0.89 161 0.89 0.90 334
Segment Entrants 0.15 0 165
Segment Exiters 0.04 0 336
Panel (b): Placebo 1 - 2008 Threshold
Stayers Entrants Exiters
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
No. of Employees 7,164.09 11.9 26 225.48 10.5 307 1,321.22 25 113
Annual Revenue 1,365.78 5.71 26 74.77 2.15 307 102.08 3 113
Limited Company 0.08 0 26 0.12 0 307 0.03 0 113
Past Time Perf e 0.78 0.75 26 0.82 0.84 306 0.81 0.81 109
Past Cost Perf e 0.91 0.93 26 0.89 0.90 306 0.91 0.93 109
Segment Entrants 0.05 0 307
Segment Exiters 0.04 0 113
Panel (c): Placebo 2 - 2012 Threshold
Stayers Entrants Exiters
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
No. of Employees 2,256.63 34.1 19 3,828.86 19 144 455.11 30 51
Annual Revenue 684.95 11.5 19 484.14 4.35 144 79.47 4.50 51
Limited Company 0.26 0 19 0.19 0 144 0.18 0 51
Past Time Perf e 0.77 0.75 19 0.80 0.80 142 0.80 0.81 48
Past Cost Perf e 0.92 0.93 19 0.86 0.86 142 0.90 0.93 48
Segment Entrants 0.10 0 144
Segment Exiters 0.04 0 51
Notes: descriptive statistics relative to the group of Stayers, Entrants and Exiters. These have been defined
according to the actual threshold revision in 2011 - panel (a) - or with two placebo reform dates in 2008 -
panel (b) - and 2012 - panel (c).No. of Employees is the average number of employees over the time span
considered; Annual Revenue reports the last 3 years’ average revenue - in US$ thousands ; Limited Company
indicates a limited liability company; Past Time and Past Cost Performance are defined as in Decarolis et al.
(2018). Segment Entrants indicates the share of Entrant firms which only appeared below the threshold prior
to October, 2010, while Segment Exiters reports the number of Exiter firms which appear only above the
threshold before the reform.
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Table 8: Triple Difference - High- and Low-type contracting offices
Panel (a): Performance Measures
Time Performance Cost Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H L H L
θˆpublic 0.020 0.084 0.000 0.077
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
N 50,087 48,002 47,720 50,369
R2 0.096 0.062 0.149 0.155
Avgservices 0.772 0.754 0.847 0.817
Avgworks 0.766 0.757 0.914 0.927
Panel (b): Renegotiation Measures
Time Overrun Cost Overrun
H L H L
θˆpublic -28.263 -108.375 36.606 -48.232
(19.769) (19.260) (37.929) (45.539)
N 50,087 48,002 47,720 50,369
R2 0.097 0.120 0.157 0.156
Avgservices 188.348 181.850 158.467 235.468
Avgworks 1.000 149.418 59.080 45.425
Notes: DDD regressions of Time Performance and Cost Performance - panel (a) - and Time Overrun and
Cost Overrun - panel (b) - on public and private oversight treatment indicators plus controls for firm size,
tender type, whether the firm is a limited liability company, whether the contract was signed during the last
week of the fiscal year, bureau, year, state, and contract object fixed effects. Odd columns report results for
contracts managed by high-competence contracting offices, even columns refer to low-competence. Standard
errors are in parentheses. In each panel, Avgservices and Avgworks account for the average outcome in the
Services and the Public Works treatment group, respectively.
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levels of competence and, conversely, contracts managed by expert officials not to be affected.
Using the same data, Decarolis et al. (2018) already showed the importance of assessing the
contracting office’s competence in dealing with public procurement performance. In order
to do so, they propose a measure of office quality defined as the persistency of contract
performance within the same purchasing organization and for the same category of procured
good or service over time. More specifically, for each contract awarded, they measure the
weighted average outcome (in terms of past cost performance and past time performance,
separately) of the contracts awarded by the same bureau in the past. A similar rationale
applies to our framework, and we build the same measure of past performance for each
contract i as past performanceik =
∑
jk<ik
wjk∗ performancejk∑
jk
wjk
, where k stands for the contracting
office, performancejk is the performance value achieved in the j
th contract awarded by k
and wjk are weights for smoothing past observations.
We repeat the exercise for cost and time performance and, aggregating past performance
at bureau level, we exploit the distribution of the variable to partition the sample according
to the contracting office competence level and run the baseline DDD estimation on the
relative subsamples. In Figure (6) we plot the estimated θpublic per decile of the competence
distribution, with the relative standard error. It is immediate to note how - consistently
with the red tape effect prediction - we estimate a positive and significant effect of public
oversight exemption only for contracting offices in the lowest deciles of the distribution, while
we cannot find any effect for more competent bureaus. On a similar page, in Table (8) we
report the results of the estimation obtained partitioning the sample in High (H)- and Low
(L)-type bureaus, depending on the median value of past performances. Not surprisingly,
we find that the detrimental effect of red tape is large and significant for contracts awarded
by the least competent contracting offices only. Hence, public oversight worsens contractors’
performance if and only if the procurement process is managed by a low-quality bureau,
while the scores for offices with a track record of excellence in project management are not
altered after the treatment.
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VII Conclusions
The oversight of public procurement process is among the most keenly debated tools for
policy-makers and practitioners due to its heterogeneous nature: it aims at reducing the
asymmetry of information between public buyers and sellers, but it can be a source of waste
and inefficiency. Our findings provide evidence of both effects for low-value contracts: on
the one hand, the public oversight overloads the contractors with unnecessary red tape, on
the other hand the private oversight, by requiring the presence of surety companies into the
procurement process, leads to the selection of better contractors and to advances in overall
performances.
From an economic perspective, the interplay between the public buyer and the surety
companies poses several interesting questions, which our results help to address. First, we
confirm empirically the results of the theoretical model proposed by CGH: the screening
exerted by the performance bonding is effective in lowering the likelihood of a low-quality
winners in public procurement tenders. Our results suggest that surety companies are helpful
in gathering “soft” information on firm types - elements like managerial practices, effort
exerted in previous projects, etc., typically impossible to be considered for public players
- and turn it into verifiable information, i.e., the premium passed through to the bids. In
this sense, the presence of private firms lowers the asymmetry of information involved in
the procurement process. Second, the public buyer, by indirectly paying the bond premium,
ensures the contract is completed either by the original contractor or by the intervention of
the surety itself, in case the seller faces issues endangering its ability to perform the project.
This makes the performance bond a perfectly suited tool for procurement practitioners, as the
final completion of the project is the first-order concern for procurers. Our findings suggest
indeed that the performance bonding has effects on the extensive margin of renegotiations,
too, thus highlighting the prominent role played by surety companies during the operational
phase.
Our findings on the negative effects of public oversight - even though in accordance with
previous literature - are especially relevant when framed into the context of bureacratic
43
competence. We find that the magnitude of red tape hinges on the persistent incapacity in
project management by public officials and we show the substantial heterogeneity of these
effects with respect to the office competence level, in a way that contracts awarded by high-
quality government offices do not seem to be affected by the cutoff revision, which is instead
extremely beneficial for contracts procured by low-quality procurers. This is in line with the
literature highlighting the role of competence in public offices as the first-order concern for
contractual performances - e.g., Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) for the Italian case.
In addition, our paper provides straightforward policy recommendations in the context
of the US federal procurement: for low-valued procurement contracts we show that it would
be possible to keep the benefits of the private oversight while avoiding the negative effects
of the public oversight by moving the thresholds for the application of the Miller Act and
for the Simplified Acquisitions independently. Moreover, the presence and the role of surety
companies are not alien from potential agency issues: there exists the possibility that very
big contractors “capture” small sureties and that, on the other hand, insurers and insured
collude to raise prices at the expenses of procurers. Unfortunately, FPDS data miss crucial
information on the surety companies backing up contractors: among the most interesting
extensions to the present work would be a dynamic analysis of the surety market in order
to address some of the above issues.
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A Appendix - For Online Publication
A.1 Data features
The previous literature used legislative thresholds in RDD in order to analyze whether
contract-allocation procedures with different levels of discretion affect procurement outcomes
(see Coviello and Mariniello (2014) and Coviello, Guglielmo and Spagnolo (2017)). As shown
in Figure (A.1), most of the “round” values - i.e., multiples of $50,000 - show significant jumps
in frequency both in pre- and post-law update: this is a clear indication of sorting before
different procedural thresholds. Some of these cutoffs, such as the one at $200,000, seem to
be mainly psychological, since FAR provides no legislative provision attached to these con-
tracts values. As a result, due to this likely endogenous sorting of contracts both prior to and
after October, 2010, the performance of firms above and below the threshold may have been
different even before the reform. Had we ignored this and performed an RDD analysis, we
could have retrieved severely upward biased estimates due to a pre-existent discontinuity.64
In order to test for endogenous sorting or discontinuities in the forcing variable, we
performed the McCrary (2008) density test for post-law data for both construction (Figure
A.2) and services (Figure A.3). The sharp discontinuity of the running variable at the
$150,000 threshold, highlighted by the graph and confirmed by the significant test results,
rules out any possibility of running a usual RDD with our data. The endogenous sorting and
its increment after the update of the SAT threshold are clear-cut evidence of the facts that (i)
winning firms’ incentives to sort themselves below $150,000 became stronger, (ii) the effect
of the confounding policy discontinuity on the potential outcome is not constant over time,
and (iii) this effect was the same in the pre- and post-treatment period (as Figure (A.4),
displaying the pre- and post-reform contract value density around the $150,000 threshold,
displays). This is confirmed by Figure (A.5), showing that pre-reform contract value density
around the $100,000 threshold is higher than post-reform.
64An instance of bunching in procurements just below legislative thresholds is presented in Palguta and
Pertold (forthcoming)
51
F
igu
re
A
.1:
C
on
tract
freq
u
en
cy
:
variou
s
b
in
sizes
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Pre−law frequency
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Post−law frequency
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Contract Value
bw = 4,000
bw = 2,000
bw = 1,000
N
o
tes:
C
on
tra
ct
freq
u
en
cies
p
re-
an
d
p
o
st-reform
,
a
b
so
lu
te
va
lu
es.
T
h
e
h
isto
g
ra
m
is
p
lo
tted
fo
r
d
iff
eren
t
b
in
w
id
th
s:
$4,000
(green
),
$2,000
(red
)
an
d
$1,000
(y
ellow
).
52
Figure A.2: McCrary Density Test - Construction Contracts
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Notes: Mccrary density in a +/- $30,0000 window around the $150,000 threshold. The dots represent the
density of projects in different intervals of project budget, the solid line represent a kernel estimate of the
density, and the two dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. Construction contracts only.
Figure A.3: McCrary Density Test - Full Sample
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Notes: McCrary density in a +/- $30,000 window around the $150,000 threshold. The dots represent the
density of projects in different intervals of project budget, the solid line represent a kernel estimate of the
density, and the two dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure A.4: Pre- and Post-reform contract value density
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Notes: Contract amount density in a +/- $20,000 window around the $150,000 threshold before (solid) and
after (dotted) - the threshold revision.
Figure A.5: Pre- and Post-reform contract value density - 100,000
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Notes: Contract amount density in a +/- $20,000 window around the $100,000 threshold before (solid) and
after (dotted) the threshold revision.
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A.2 Summary statistics
Table (A.1) reports selected summary statistics for the lower control group of services - along
with those for the treatment group, already presented in (2) - before and after the October,
2010 reform. In Table (A.2) we report summary statistics for the constructions sample and
distinguish, again, the above treatment/control before/after groups scheme. Tables (A.3)
and (A.4) display the number of contracts by department and year before and after the
reform when considering the upper and the lower control group, respectively, for the anal-
ysis. Finally, Table (A.6) presents the composition of treatment and both lower and upper
control groups in terms of the categories of service content of contracts representing around
97 per cent of observations. The distribution of categories is quite regular across groups.
This exercise is aimed to show that the treatment group truly constitutes a representative
subsample in our population of contracts.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics - Services Treatment Group with Lower Control Group
Lower Control Group
Before After
Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N
Time Performance 0.7 0.3 0.74 51,245 0.7 0.3 0.82 52,737
Num Time Amendments 2.4 2.8 1 51,245 1.4 2.1 0 52,737
Prob Time Revision 0.6 0.5 1 51,245 0.6 0.5 1 52,737
Avg Time Overrun 199.4 252.3 128.6 27,887 214.0 287.9 115.6 22,684
Cost Performance 0.7 0.3 0.91 51,245 0.8 0.3 0.98 52,737
Num Cost Amendments 2.8 3.2 2 51,245 1.8 2.6 1 52,737
Prob Cost Revision 0.6 0.5 1 51,245 0.5 0.5 1 52,737
Avg Cost Overrun 273.8 333.5 205.1 31,587 307.8 413.7 176.8 27,481
Contract Value 1,896.8 9,311.5 421.7 51,245 1,098.6 4,334.6 300 52,737
# Contractual Days 417.6 404.5 364 51,245 305.1 222.1 357 52,737
Offers received 5.4 18.7 2 51,245 5.7 18.7 2 52,737
Treatment Group
Before After
Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N
Time Performance 0.8 0.3 1 13,774 0.8 0.3 1 2,061
Num Time Amendments 1.1 2.0 0 13,774 0.7 1.5 0 2,061
Prob Time Revision 0.4 0.5 0 13,774 0.3 0.5 0 2,061
Avg Time Overrun 229.9 287.3 141 4,763 187.6 250.5 100 565
Cost Performance 0.8 0.3 1 13,774 0.9 0.2 1 2,061
Num Cost Amendments 1.3 2.3 0 13,774 0.8 1.7 0 2,061
Prob Cost Revision 0.4 0.5 0 13,774 0.3 0.5 0 2,061
Avg Cost Overrun 101.2 125.9 64.2 5,377 67.5 96.7 34.1 625
Contract Value 122.2 15.2 121.2 13,774 122.0 16.1 120.1 2,061
# Contractual Days 298.9 342.8 215 13,774 228.2 191.1 205 2,061
Offers received 4.7 14.5 2 13,774 3.9 18.9 1 2,061
Notes: the table reports descriptive statistics for both the Lower Control Group (upper panel) and the
treatment group (lower panel), before (left side) and after (right side) the threshold revision. Time and Cost
Performance are relative measures of performance - bounded 0 to 1; Num Time and Num Cost Amendments
count the number of amendments per contract, while the relative Prob is a binary variable that takes value
1 in case of any amendment occurs; Avg Time and Avg Cost Overrun account for the average extra time or
extra cost and is defined only for contracts which had at least one amendment; Contract Value is expressed
in US$ thousands; Offers Received report the number of offers received per tender.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics - Public Works Sample with Upper Control Group
Upper Control Group
Before After
Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N
Time Performance 0.7 0.3 0.67 5,787 0.7 0.3 0.76 2,789
Num Time Amendments 3.2 3.0 2 5,787 2.6 2.9 1 2,789
Prob Time Revision 0.7 0.4 1 5,787 0.7 0.5 1 2,789
Avg Time Overrun 113.1 155.8 69 4,045 100.4 147.5 56.1 1,746
Cost Performance 0.9 0.2 0.94 5,787 0.9 0.2 0.96 2,789
Num Cost Amendments 3.6 3.4 2 5,787 2.8 3.2 1 2,789
Prob Cost Revision 0.8 0.4 1 5,787 0.7 0.5 1 2,789
Avg Cost Overrun 123.5 186.7 47.9 4,466 190.0 357.2 66.7 1,876
Contract Value 6,265.4 20,015.3 661.0 5,787 4,510.8 12,132.9 484.7 2,789
# Contractual Days 335.4 283.9 249 5,787 277.1 220.7 205 2,789
Offers received 4.3 4.0 3 5,787 4.4 4.6 3 2,789
Treatment Group
Before After
Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N
Time Performance 0.7 0.3 0.95 947 0.8 0.3 1 90
Num Time Amendments 1.1 1.7 0 947 0.5 0.9 0 90
Prob Time Revision 0.5 0.5 1 947 0.4 0.5 0 90
Avg Time Overrun 131.8 169.0 83.8 417 133.4 129.2 105 27
Cost Performance 0.9 0.2 1 947 0.9 0.1 1 90
Num Cost Amendments 1.0 1.6 0 947 0.5 0.9 0 90
Prob Cost Revision 0.5 0.5 0 947 0.3 0.5 0 90
Avg Cost Overrun 39.1 99.9 10.8 446 30.7 36.2 17.3 26
Contract Value 123.7 14.7 123.4 947 123.8 14.0 123.6 90
# Contractual Days 171.4 210.5 115 947 182.2 186.9 121 90
Offers received 3.7 11.4 3 947 2.7 1.8 3 90
Notes: the table reports descriptive statistics for both the Public Works Upper Control Group (upper panel)
and the Public Works treatment group (lower panel), before (left side) and after (right side) the threshold
revision. Time and Cost Performance are relative measures of performance - bounded 0 to 1; Num Time and
Num Cost Amendments count the number of amendments per contract, while the relative Prob is a binary
variable that takes value 1 in case of any amendment occurs; Avg Time and Avg Cost Overrun account for
the average extra time or extra cost and is defined only for contracts which had at least one amendment;
Contract Value is expressed in US$ thousands; Offers Received report the number of offers received per
tender.
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Table A.3: Number of contracts by department and year - Upper control group and treatment
group
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Dept of Agriculture 76 42 58 57 75 153 145 118 85 110 12
Dept of Commerce 635 639 605 660 948 1,187 1,073 862 857 666 121
Dept of Defense 336 380 404 502 330 384 368 441 307 265 26
Dept of Education 12 17 18 19 27 37 15 26 10 7 1
Dept of Energy 8 13 24 17 19 48 34 38 23 20 5
Dept of Health and 132 324 462 971 989 1,422 717 147 21 10 3
Human Services
Dept of Homeland 23 20 17 13 13 24 13 14 8 17 3
Security
Dept of Housing 12 13 17 24 34 137 100 112 86 94 17
Dept of Interior 462 469 497 398 656 1,118 525 482 361 411 146
Dept of Justice 278 286 394 332 365 532 481 387 369 392 44
Dept of Labor 1,262 3,218 4,792 4,862 4,807 4,649 3,821 3,716 2,398 2,104 302
Dept of State 41 60 59 65 57 44 50 41 35 36 8
Dept of Treasury 109 101 77 106 105 127 88 104 76 105 15
Dept of 1,209 1,156 1,036 991 1,095 1,205 1,160 1,035 899 844 105
Transportation
Dept of Veteran 843 846 1,197 1,206 1,170 1,097 1,248 1,249 1,029 887 191
Affairs
Environmental 47 48 55 44 49 111 48 18 23 12 1
Protection Agency
General Services 410 789 736 737 1,047 1,602 1,116 963 896 902 115
Administration
NASA 357 374 698 679 991 1,469 1,812 2,000 2,010 1,993 582
Nuclear Regulatory 144 45 74 67 78 165 148 142 143 129 26
Commission
National Science 22 107 129 187 247 379 405 382 302 252 76
Foundation
Office of Personnel 306 400 442 331 346 397 362 418 291 269 39
Management
Small Business 213 437 726 907 840 1,050 1,048 1,019 836 656 127
Administration
Social Security 749 596 787 1,227 1,963 3,354 3,223 2,972 2,823 2,325 958
Administration
N 7,686 10,380 13,304 14,402 16,251 20,691 18,000 16,686 13,888 12,506 2,923
Notes: Number of contracts by year/department; Upper control group and treatment group. Pre-treatment
period: January 2005 to October, 2010; post-treatment periods: October 2010 to September 2015.
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Table A.4: Number of contracts by agency and year - Lower control group and treatment
group
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Dept of Agriculture 82 70 73 60 124 159 224 157 124 153 17
Dept of Commerce 440 426 367 439 517 706 665 558 581 518 149
Dept of Defense 231 250 293 299 232 209 201 222 222 195 34
Dept of Education 5 8 10 16 17 43 22 27 12 10 2
Dept of Energy 1 5 8 8 15 28 12 24 19 21 4
Dept of Health and 443 597 851 1,470 1,476 1,314 434 101 31 16 5
Human Services
Dept of Homeland 21 15 23 13 22 30 12 15 12 10 3
Security
Dept of Housing 8 18 23 26 26 265 182 178 125 83 10
Dept of Interior 422 507 530 492 738 1,037 587 619 401 432 348
Dept of Justice 380 295 301 367 381 443 413 371 316 289 43
Dept of Labor 551 1,914 3,441 3,451 3,342 3,364 2,890 2,716 1,885 1,780 356
Dept of State 11 15 21 19 14 30 21 16 14 21 3
Dept of Treasury 93 97 56 49 53 56 83 71 61 69 14
Dept of 890 933 909 903 953 837 724 716 616 622 146
Transportation
Dept of Veteran 542 467 596 594 551 477 601 598 509 485 156
Affairs
Environmental 18 31 48 30 30 38 9 8 9 8
Protection Agency
General Services 304 759 853 980 1,117 1,323 1,020 861 770 768 149
Administration
NASA 193 240 395 452 781 1,100 1,500 1,431 1,399 1,790 656
Nuclear Regulatory 100 46 58 56 58 104 105 83 70 80 19
Commission
National Science 24 101 133 165 209 361 301 270 203 161 68
Foundation
Office of Personnel 190 200 229 204 243 252 261 194 147 126 28
Management
Small Business 77 213 549 527 490 716 693 549 504 356 65
Administration
Social Security 573 586 673 981 1,728 2,897 2,757 2,215 1,933 1,670 968
Administration
N 5,599 7,793 10,440 11,601 13,117 15,789 13,717 12,000 9,963 9,663 3,243
Notes: Number of contracts by year/department; Lower control group and treatment group. Pre-treatment
period: January 2005 to October, 2010; post-treatment periods: October 2010 to September 2015.
59
Figure A.6: Categories of services by Treatment Group and Lower/Upper Control Groups
Notes: Number of contracts by year/department; Upper control group and treatment group. Pre-treatment
period: January 2005 to October, 2010; post-treatment periods: October 2010 to September 2015.
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A.3 Legal Details - public oversight
The FAR requires procurement officers to exert an ex-ante and ex-post
The sealed bidding acquisition process involves six steps in the US Government procure-
ment: i) performance work statement : officers draft a written specification for the agency
requirements; ii) solicitation preparation: the invitation for bid has to describe the require-
ments clearly, accurately, and completely without unnecessarily restrictive specifications that
would unduly limit the number of bidders; iii) invitation for bid : the officers publicize the
tender on Federal Business Opportunities, in case of domestic award, or local newspapers or
websites, in case of abroad award, and in sufficient time to enable prospective bidders to pre-
pare and submit bids; iv) bid submission: bidders submit sealed bids to be publicly opened
at the time and place stated in the invitation for bid; v) bid evaluation: the officers evaluate
bids without discussion with bidders; and vi) contract award: the contracting officer awards
to the lowest-priced, responsive bidder. Differently, federal procurement negotiation refers
to any acquisition method that is not sealed bidding and involves nine steps. i) performance
work statement: as in the case of sealed bidding, officers draft a written specification for the
agency requirements; ii) request for proposals preparation: as in the case of an invitation
for bid, the contracting agency describes its requirements clearly and accurately and does
so without unnecessarily restrictive requirements which would unduly limit the number of
offerors; iii) request for proposal: the contracting officers publicizes the request for proposal
through all appropriate means, including Federal Business Opportunities, local newspapers,
embassy, consulate or procurement office website, or any other locally acceptable means of
advertising the requirement; iv) proposal submission: offerors prepare and submit techni-
cal and price proposals in response to the request for proposals; v) proposals evaluation:
a technical evaluation panel evaluates the technical proposals against the technical evalu-
ation criteria included in the request for proposal. The contracting officer evaluates the
price proposals to determine whether the proposed prices are reasonable and reflect the of-
feror’s understanding of, and ability to perform, the contract. The contracting officer then
determines which proposals are in the competitive range based on both technical and price
factors. vi) Discussions conducted. The contracting officer holds oral and/or written discus-
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sions with each offeror in the competitive range to resolve uncertainties and to provide each
offeror with an understanding of the technical or price weaknesses in its proposal; vii) final
proposal revisions request: once discussions are concluded, the contracting officer issues a
written request for final proposal revisions from all offerors in the competitive range; viii)
final proposal revisions evaluation: the technical evaluation panel and the contracting offi-
cer evaluate final proposal revisions in the same manner as initial offers; and ix) contract
award: the contracting officer awards a contract to the responsible offeror whose offer is
most advantageous, considering price and other related evaluation factors as stated in the
solicitation.
Furthermore, according to FAR 42.1104a) the contract administration office determines
the extent of production surveillance on the basis of 1) the degree of importance to the
Government assigned by the contracting officer to the supplies or services; and 2) Consid-
eration of the following factors: (i) Contract requirements for reporting production progress
and performance; ii) The contract performance schedule; iii) The contractor’s production
plan; iv) The contractor’s history of contract performance; v) The contractor’s experience
with the contract supplies or services; vi) The contractor’s financial capability; vii) Any
supplementary written instructions from the contracting office.
Operational Stage Auditing officers within each contracting office are in charge to require
sellers to (i) complete expenditure justification forms and submit cost or pricing data certi-
fying that expenses are based on adequate price competition; and (ii) submit reports on the
project’s progress to specific evaluation teams.65 In the first case, according to FAR 15.402,
in establishing the reasonableness of the offered prices, the contracting officer shall obtain i)
certified cost or pricing data, along with data other than certified cost or pricing data as nec-
essary to establish a fair and reasonable price and ii) the type and quantity of data necessary
to establish a fair and reasonable price, but not more data than is necessary. The second
case involves Government review and analysis of (i) contractor performance plans, schedules,
controls, and industrial processes; and ii) the contractor’s actual performance under them.
65The number and type of checks are similar for each contracting office, as provided by the FAR, and their
scope is analogous; we can coherently group them into one set.
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A.4 Additional Robustness Checks
We test the robustness of our baseline DDD findings on three dimensions. We first check
in Table (A.5) whether the results are robust in different subsets of the baseline sample;
secondly, we run the estimation on absolute overrun values, namely Cost Overrun and Time
Overrun, in Table (A.6); finally, we show the robustness of our results using the lower control
group in Table (A.7).
We are concerned with possible sources of contamination due to the unobserved engineers’
estimate value: in fact, we do not observe the ex-ante valuation of the project but only
whether it lays within the $100,000-150,000 band (i.e., if it is subject to the SAP or not. In
order to test whether the possible misclassification of contracts to the treatment group drives
our results, in Table (A.5), columns (2) and (6), we rule out observations in a (-$10,000, +
$10,000) window around $100,000 - Contamin. Results are robust and, if anything, there is
a positive variation in the magnitude of the estimates. In columns (3) and (7) we run the
baseline model on a narrower time window (2008-2013), reducing the risk that our results
are driven by long-term trends in the data.
Public officers are specifically demanded to carry out an ex-post monitoring of work status
in all services contracts except constructions. In the construction industry, instead, this is
a task for the surety. We want to check whether the presence of an additional service-only
specific treatment drives our results - mainly with respect to the public oversight estimates.
Hence, we modify the triple difference model in equation (3) to:
yijt = α + β1Waiverit + β2Postit + θpublic (Waiverit ∗ Postit) +
+ β3Constrit + β4 (Constrit ∗Waiverit) + β5 (Constrit ∗ Postit) +
+ θprivate (Constrit ∗Waiverit ∗ Postit) + θpcT pcit + γXit + δt + ζj + εijt
(6)
where T pcit is a binary treatment variable active for services-only contracts above the
threshold. Results of the estimation are reported in columns (4) and (8): parameter θˆpc
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Table A.5: Triple Difference - Differential Shocks Robustness Checks
Time Performance Cost Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Base Contamin 2008-2013 Public Check Base Contamin 2008-2013 Public Check
θˆpublic 0.048 0.052 0.048 0.048 0.045 0.046 0.050 0.042
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
θˆprivate -0.067 -0.061 -0.058 -0.067 -0.037 -0.036 -0.037 -0.034
(0.027) (0.023) (0.035) (0.029) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
N 98,089 92,101 68,251 98,089 98,089 92,101 68,251 98,089
R2 0.110 0.109 0.119 0.110 0.206 0.206 0.211 0.206
Avgservices 0.763 0.760 0.751 0.763 0.832 0.827 0.818 0.832
Avgworks 0.763 0.764 0.752 0.763 0.918 0.914 0.913 0.918
Notes: results of various DDD models of Time Performance - columns (1) to (4) - and Cost Performance -
columns (5) to (8) - on public and private oversight treatment indicators plus controls for firm size, tender
type, whether the firm is a limited liability company, whether the contract was signed during the last week of
the fiscal year, bureau, year, state, and contract object fixed effects. Base reports the baseline model results;
in Contamin we account for the possible contamination at the $100,000 threshold dropping all contracts
whose face value lies between $90,000 and $110,000; 2008-13 is self-explanatory and Public Check reports
results of a modified model with a specific treatment dummy for public on-site monitoring. In each panel,
Avgservices and Avgworks account for the average outcome in the Service and the Public Works treatment
group, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the object * year level.
(unreported) is not statistically significant.
A second set of checks are reported in Table (A.6), in which the baseline DDD model, with
an increasing number of controls and fixed effects, is implemented on different dependent
variables: panel (a) reports results on Time Overrun (in days), while panel (b) reports Cost
Overrun (in dollars).
There are two contract groups potentially suitable for use as a control. Although in
the baseline regressions we use contracts always subject to oversight (upper control group),
we also have data on all those contracts that are never subject to oversight (lower control
group). Table (A.7) presents the baseline and robustness triple difference regressions using
the lower control group. The estimates prove to be robust to the change in control group
both in terms of sign and magnitude.
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Table A.6: Triple Difference - Overruns
Panel (a): Time Overrun
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
θˆpublic -45.135 -40.632 -66.450 -66.258 -62.684
(11.741) (14.021) (14.515) (14.515) (14.446)
θˆprivate 48.670 42.410 122.463 125.616 121.099
(19.777) (20.623) (23.868) (24.176) (23.355)
N 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089
R2 0.031 0.049 0.114 0.117 0.126
Avgservices 185.228 185.228 185.228 185.228 185.228
Avgworks 117.565 117.565 117.565 117.565 117.565
Panel (b): Cost Overrun
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
θˆpublic 13.407 44.724 -11.120 -10.778 -16.752
(24.366) (29.639) (31.046) (30.235) (29.185)
θˆprivate -239.847 -248.666 -193.147 -190.790 -206.209
(90.362) (89.775) (70.828) (62.860) (65.324)
N 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089
R2 0.046 0.121 0.181 0.187 0.201
Avgservices 259.193 259.193 259.193 259.193 259.193
Avgworks 72.954 72.954 72.954 72.954 72.954
Controls X X X X
Bureau Fixed Effects X X X
State Fixed Effects X X
Object Fixed Effects X
Notes: results of the DDD regression of Time Overrun - panel (a) - and Cost Overrun - panel (b) - on public
oversight and private oversight treatment indicators plus increasing controls and fixed effects. In each panel,
Avgservices and Avgworks account for the average outcome in the Services and the Public Works treatment
group, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the object * year level.
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Table A.7: Triple Difference - Lower Control Group
Panel (a): Time Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Base Contamin Sanitary 2008-2013 Range Public Check Input PSW
θˆpublic 0.047 0.041 0.035 0.052 0.064 0.035 0.047 0.079
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
θˆprivate -0.005 0.009 0.013 -0.000 -0.024 0.007 -0.003 -0.007
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.042)
N 74,973 60,459 54,854 52,092 26,540 74,973 74,973 73,856
R2 0.118 0.118 0.119 0.133 0.125 0.119 0.120 0.134
Avgservices 0.802 0.802 0.800 0.803 0.802 0.802 0.802 0.802
Avgworks 0.828 0.826 0.824 0.830 0.834 0.828 0.828 0.828
Panel (b): Cost Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
θˆpublic 0.059 0.052 0.049 0.064 0.076 0.046 0.058 0.085
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
θˆprivate -0.044 -0.039 -0.036 -0.046 -0.056 -0.032 -0.043 -0.065
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
N 74,973 60,459 54,854 52,092 26,540 74,973 74,973 75,373
R2 0.172 0.169 0.171 0.190 0.181 0.173 0.174 0.208
Avgservices 0.880 0.880 0.877 0.875 0.879 0.880 0.880 0.883
Avgworks 0.948 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.944 0.948 0.948 0.949
Notes: results of various DDD models of Time Performance - panel (a) - and Cost Performance - panel (b)
- on public and private oversight treatment indicators plus controls for firm size, tender type, whether the
firm is a limited liability company, whether the contract was signed during the last week of the fiscal year,
bureau, year, state, and contract object fixed effects. Base reports the baseline model results; in Contamin
we account for the possible contamination at the $100,000 threshold dropping all contracts whose face value
lies between $90,000 and $110,000; in a similar fashion Sanitary model deals with the contamination at
both thresholds ($100,000 and $150,000) by dropping two 10 percent sanitary bands around; 2008-13 is
self-explanatory and Range reports results of the same model applied to a sample of contracts trimmed at
a face value of $500,000. Public Check - abbreviated to P.Check - reports results of a modified model with
a specific treatment dummy for public on-site monitoring while in the Input model we added controls for
public works input prices throughout the period. Finally, PSW reports the results of the Propensity Score
weighted DDD. In each panel, Avgservices and Avgworks account for the average outcome in the Service and
the Public Works treatment group, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the object * year level.
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A.5 Synthetic Control Group Approach for Public Oversight
The SC method, pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) is an alternative approach
for program evaluation that relaxes the parallel trends assumption. Abadie, Diamond and
Hainmueller (2010) introduced the SC method in the context of comparative case studies,
where only one or a few units are subject to intervention, while a larger set of units remained
untreated. The central idea behind the SC method is that the outcomes from the control
units are weighted so as to construct the counterfactual outcome for the treated unit, in the
absence of the treatment. In contrast to the DD method, the SC method allows the effects
of observed and unobserved predictors of the outcome to change over time, while assuming
that pre-intervention covariates have a linear relationship with outcomes post-treatment. A
SC unit is defined as the time-invariant weighted average of available control units, which
prior to the intervention have similar pre-intervention characteristics and outcome trajectory
to the treated unit. In order to run our SC robustness exercise, we thus need to i) specify
the predictor variables employed for the SC group generation and ii) present the reasoning
for defining the pool of controls.
First, when computationally feasible, perhaps the simplest strategy for specifying pre-
dictors is to include every pre-treatment outcome in the predictor set. Different sets of
predictors may result in different synthetic controls, and there is little explicit guidance in
the SC literature to assess predictor choice. Within the pre-intervention sample, one cannot
do any better in terms of pre-intervention mean squared prediction error than to include
every pre-intervention outcome. However, this will not be true when predicting out of the
pre-intervention sample, which is ultimately the object of interest in SC design. Matching
on high frequency - i.e., weekly or monthly - pre-intervention data may actually produce
less reliable synthetic controls. As a result, as any characteristics unaffected by the pol-
icy treatment are possible candidates, we thus consider in this exercise annualized averages
of the pre-treatment outcome (Time Performance and Cost Performance) and the control
variables we use in our baseline DDD model (Small, Negotiation, Fixed Price, Bureau Size).
Moreover, following the impact of bureaucratic competence on contract outcomes through
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red tape, as highlighted in section VI, we also include time competence and cost competence
as predictors for time performance and cost performance, respectively.
Second, we split the lower control group in $5,000 interval subgroups while the up-
per control group in larger intervals to include a similar number of observations for each:
$10,000 until $250,000; $25,000 between $250,000 and $500,000; $50,000 between $500,000
and $1,000,000; $100,000 between $1,000,000 and $1,500,000; $250,000 between $1,500,000
and $3,000,000; $500,000 between $3,000,000 and $4,500,000; $1,000,000 between $4,500,000
and $10,000,000; $5,000,000 between $10,000,000 and $30,000,000; those above $30,000,000.
Figure A.7: Synthetic Control Group - Weights
Cost Performance Time Performance
Notes: Weights associated to each donor group in synthetic control group analysis for public oversight - cost
(left panel) and time performance (right panel).
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A.6 Propensity Score Matching DDD
In section V.3, we document a possible issue that can emerge from our analysis and under-
mine its validity. Indeed, the DDD method provides unbiased effect estimates under the
assumption that in our data the construction and non-constructions trends over time would
have been the same between the relative treatment and comparison groups in the absence
of the intervention. By controlling for characteristics that may be contributing to unobserv-
able selection bias, we are thus achieving identification of treatment effects. However, the
treatment and control groups may also differ in ways that could affect their compositions
overtime and DDD estimates may pick up differential shocks across subsectors or size of
projects other than the ones we isolate (i.e., the fact that constructions are also subject
to the Miller act) in addition to different trends. In order to account for this concern, we
propose a test for robustness in which we combine the DDD methodology with a matching
approach. By introducing a propensity score matching analysis we are appealing to the con-
ditional independence assumption, that is the idea that matched comparisons imply balance
on observed covariates, which recreates a situation similar to a randomized experiment where
all subjects are essentially the same except for the treatment. In combination with the DDD
strategy, we still account for of any unobserved characteristics that are constant across time
between the two groups. The idea is to reconstruct the parametric DDD model presented
in equation (3) as a weighted least squares procedure, where observations are weighted to
ensure similarity on a set of observed pre-treatment variables. The DDD differences out the
permanent confounders while matching on pre-treatment characteristics captures transitory
shocks.66 Specifically, we proceeded as follows. First, we compute the propensity score. The
estimated propensity score e(.) is the predicted probability of each contract of being treated
and in our setting is derived from the fitted logit regression of the treatment status Waiveri
on pre-treatment covariates z.67 We then construct a weighting variable wi for the DDD es-
66Hybrid program evaluation methods like this are generally more robust than stand-alone approaches.
See Cerulli (2016).
67We used as controls the 22 category fixed effects (2 for constructions and 20 for non-constructions),
year fixed effects, limited and a dummy variable indicating whether the expected work duration exceeds the
year length as a proxy for complexity. The choice mirrors the strategy to intercept intrasector time-varying
shocks conditioning on different layers of object complexity. We also included the other exogenous controls
from our outcome model and obtained comparable results.
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timates similarly to an inverse probability of treatment weighting approach (DiNardo, Fortin
and Lemieux, 1996). Specifically, following Hirano and Imbens (2001), the weights are cal-
culated such that wi = Waiveri + (1−Waiveri) e(z)1−e(z) where the weight is equal to 1 for the
treated group and e(z)
1−e(z) for the untreated. The result of this operation was the creation of
two groups of treated and untreated contracts with similar distribution of propensity score.
The weights ensure that the covariates are uncorrelated with the treatment indicator. Each
treated contract is matched with the the four closest untreated contracts based on similar
values on the propensity scores.68 In Figure (A.8), we show the comparison of the propensity
score distributions across the treated and the untreated contracts before and after match-
ing. This graph illustrates the successful adjustment of post-mastching propensity score
distribution for the control group and visually shows that e(z) in our analysis is in fact
balanced across treatment and comparison groups.69 We label this strategy as propensity
score weighting triple difference. This estimator has the further advantage of not requiring
the imposition of the linear-in-parameters form of the outcome equation. As such, it can be
seen as a non-parametric DDD (see Heckman et al. (1998)).
68We follow Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) and use 4 matching neighbors and estimate the average treat-
ment on the treated. We also perform the same analysis using 1, 2, 4, and 5 matching neighbors, finding
similar results.
69We have also verified that covariates are balanced across treatment and comparison groups in the
weighted sample. Table are available on request.
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Figure A.8: Propensity Score Distribution: Pre-Post Matching Comparison - Cost Perfor-
mance
Notes: Distributions of estimated probabilities of being a treated contract (propensity score). The compar-
ison is presented by treatment group (blue line) and control group (red dashed line) prior to and after the
matching is implemented.
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A.7 Agencies and Clusters
Table (A.8) reports results on public and private oversight treatment effects for baseline DDD
models of Time Performance and Cost Performance when standard errors are clustered at
various levels: no clusterized robust (columns 1-2) - used in the empirical analysis -, con-
tractingoffice * year (3-4), contractingoffice * object (columns 5-6), contractingoffice * year *
object (columns 7-8), contractingoffice * year * state (columns 9-10) and contractingoffice *
year * state * object (columns 11-12). DDD average treatment effects result in being robust
to these different clusterization levels for both public and private oversight.
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A.8 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A.9: Scatterplot of Performances Measures
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Notes: Each point represents the contract level of Time and Cost Performance.
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Table A.9: Triple Difference - Time Performance
Panel (a): Time Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
θˆpublic 0.026 0.028 0.050 0.050 0.048
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
θˆprivate -0.001 0.004 -0.064 -0.066 -0.067
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
Waiver 0.092 0.076 0.053 0.052 0.050
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Constr -0.014 -0.031 0.002 0.000 0.017
(0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007)
Constr * Waiver -0.017 -0.007 0.020 0.023 0.025
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Constr * Post 0.022 0.023 0.038 0.037 0.036
(0.023) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Small -0.011 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Negotiation 0.008 -0.015 -0.017 -0.019
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Fixed Price 0.085 0.070 0.070 0.076
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Bureau Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089
R2 0.015 0.028 0.094 0.098 0.110
Avgservices 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763
Avgworks 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763
Controls X X X X
Bureau Fixed Effects X X X
State Fixed Effects X X
Object Fixed Effects X
Notes: Notes: complete set of regressions coefficients of Table (3) panel a).
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Table A.10: Triple Difference - Cost Performance
Panel (b): Cost Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
θˆpublic 0.018 0.016 0.039 0.039 0.045
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
θˆprivate -0.003 0.004 -0.028 -0.030 -0.037
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Waiver 0.102 0.065 0.043 0.042 0.040
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constr 0.162 0.099 0.114 0.106 0.072
(0.022) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008)
Constr * Waiver -0.057 -0.020 -0.007 -0.005 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Constr * Post -0.045 -0.029 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
(0.026) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012)
Small -0.005 0.008 0.008 0.009
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Negotiation 0.009 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Fixed Price 0.223 0.185 0.184 0.174
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Bureau Size -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089 98,089
R2 0.036 0.120 0.184 0.189 0.206
Avgservices 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832
Avgworks 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.918
Controls X X X X
Bureau Fixed Effects X X X
State Fixed Effects X X
Object Fixed Effects X
Notes: complete set of regressions coefficients of Table (3) panel b).
76
